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Abstract
Fiscal Policy in an Economically Integrated World
by
Tristin Beckman
Eight years after the 2008 Global Financial crisis the global economy continued to
muddle through weak economic growth. At the same time elected officials have lashed
against the post-war trend toward greater economic integration, as illustrated by the
election of Donald Trump in the United States and the United Kingdom’s vote to with-
draw from the European Union. This dissertation argues that the relationship between
economic growth and policies favoring economic integration are deeply intertwined. I
argue that trade interdependence played an important role in causing policymakers to
roll back expansionary fiscal policies before a robust recovery had taken hold. This
anemic economic recovery then increased the policy influence of interest groups with
more protectionist policy preferences. This dissertation, therefore, integrates economic
interdependence with domestic politics to deepen our understanding of economic policy
choices. To this point, however, the international political economy literature remains
largely divided with respect to levels of analysis. At the domestic level, researchers con-
tinue to analyze domestic preferences and institutions as if they are independent from
others states in the global economy; while at the systemic level, researchers tend to an-
alyze relations between states independent from domestic politics. Much of this division
is methodological. Until recently, statistical models assumed observations were inde-
pendently distributed, forcing researchers to assume away interdependence in statistical
analyses. This project takes advantage of recent advances in spatial econometrics that
help to account for interdependence between units to offer a more complete understanding
ix
of domestic level policies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nationalism, trade protectionism, and overt xenophobia – the developed world has en-
tered an era reminiscent of the 1930s. The upheaval that the world experienced in the
1930s is largely attributed to one fundamental cause: the Great Depression. Following
the 2008 financial crisis, however, scholars noted a lack of economic nationalism and ex-
tremist politics (Drezner, 2014; Kahler and Lake, 2013). It seemed we would be spared
a repeat of the 1930s. But, following a wave of populist electoral successes throughout
the developed world a few years after the 2008 crisis, optimistic predictions of the 2010s
being fundamentally different from the 1930s may have proved premature.
After the initial deep recession that sparked the Great Depression, industrialized
economies experienced weak, albeit in most cases positive, economic growth. For exam-
ple, by 1933 the recession had ended in the United States, but robust growth did pick
up until after World War 2 (Eichengreen, 2014). This long period of dismal performance
led the then president of the American Economic Association, Alvin Hansen, to state the
possibility that the developed world faced weak growth for the foreseeable future (Hansen,
1939). Thus, the economic context of the 1930s, which provided the fodder for populist
political movements, was marked by weak economic growth, or “secular stagnation.”
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Assuming recessions and stagnant recoveries are generally caused by shortfalls in
aggregate demand, economists since Keynes (1936) have noted that governments can
enact an expansionary fiscal policy to end recessions and speed up an economic recovery
(Borg et al., 2014; Summers, 2015).1 But policymakers in several countries often do
the opposite and enact contractionary fiscal policies in response to recessions and slow
recoveries. These policies may have exacerbated economic stagnation, leading to the
political upheaval witnessed in both the 1930s and the mid-2010s (Blyth, 2013).
That incumbents would enact such policies is puzzling because elected officials who
oversee weak economic growth are generally punished electorally in subsequent elections
(Achen and Bartels, 2016). Although fiscal policy is constrained, to some extent, by
economic factors, the decision to engage in stimulus or austerity is, at its core, political.
Thus to understand the fiscal policy response to recessions and slow recoveries, we must
explore the political calculus involved with various fiscal policy choices.
Most research on the politics of the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath focus on
domestic-level factors, and downplay the fact that political decisions, which may appear
to be domestically-driven on the surface, are made in the context of a closely integrated
global economy (Oatley, 2011). Similarly, theoretical studies of the politics of fiscal
policy generally focus on domestic-level factors. But fiscal policy can influence or be
influenced by net exports and, therefore, has important international dimensions. This
dissertation places economic interdependence at the center of its analysis. I argue that
an incorporation of economic interdependence extends our understanding of fiscal policy
during economic recessions and recoveries. I also analyze how economic interdependence
partially determines how interest groups, with specific policy preferences over a range of
1Scholars have looked toward supply side factors, such as population growth and the slowing of
technological progress, to explain weak economic growth in the 1930s and 2010s (Hansen, 1939; Gordon,
2016). If this were the case, governments would not easily be able to enact short-term policies to boost
supply side growth because of the necessary time lag for something like technological innovation to have
an effect on the economy.
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issues, gain political influence relative to other interest groups within a country.
The rest of this introduction is organized as follows. First, I briefly explain the
economics of fiscal policy, discussing how an expansionary fiscal policy can bring a country
back to economic growth. I then discuss the role of trade interdependence. Here, I show
why there is a close relationship between fiscal policy and economic interdependence. In
this section I also briefly summarize the core chapters of this dissertation.
1.1 The Economics of Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy is a key tool for policymakers to end recessions and spur recoveries.
Scholars using a New Keynesian framework argue that most downturns are caused by
negative shocks to aggregate demand. Shocks may result from drops in business or
consumer confidence. New Keynesian models suggest that expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies can boost aggregate demand and thereby end recessions and speed recover-
ies. During relatively small negative shocks, monetary policy alone may suffice to bring
economies back to robust growth (Krugman, 1998; Summers, 2014). But, as experience
in the 1930s and 2010s has demonstrated, recovery is more difficult if aggregate demand
falls and interest rates would have to go below zero in order to recover fallen output.
With interest rates at or near the zero lower bound, monetary expansion will have little
or no effect on aggregate demand. This condition is known as the liquidity trap.
The suggested Keynesian policy response to a liquidity trap is fiscal stimulus with an
accommodating monetary policy to offset the rise in interest rates that might otherwise
follow an increase in government spending. Even in instances where monetary authorities
have room to stimulate the economy – where interest rates are not at the zero lower bound
– fiscal policy can assist monetary policy to increase aggregate demand and thus bring
about a stronger recovery (Krugman, 1998). Furthermore, recent research shows that
3
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since the late 1990s, equilibrium real interest rates have been trending downward in the
developed world (King and Low, 2014; Summers, 2015). With equilibrium interest rates
closer to the zero lower bound, monetary policy may continue to be less effective and
fiscal policy may need to play a more central role in promoting economic recoveries than
in the 1980s and 1990s.
Not all models suggest that expansionary fiscal policies will lead to recovery. Neo-
classical, real business cycle models begin with the micro-level assumption that economic
agents quickly respond to changes in the environment (Kydland and Prescott, 1982;
Plosser, 1989). These models argue that supply side factors, such as shifts in technology,
rather than shifts in aggregate demand, are the key source of economic fluctuations.2
Building on the theory of rational expectations (Lucas, 1976; Muth, 1961), Barro (1989)
argues that expansionary fiscal policies will have no positive effect on aggregate demand
because economic actors will match government spending with an equivalent increase of
private savings to pay for future tax increases required to fund the government’s deficits.
This theory of “Barro-Ricardian equivalence” implies that expansionary fiscal policies
in response to a recession will fail to bring about a recovery and may actually slow the
recovery process by hampering the economy’s natural rate of adjustment.
Although these competing schools of thought are completely at odds, Rodrik (2015)
points out that determining which model best explains a phenomenon depends on the
context. Although neoclassical models may do well when explaining several areas of
interest – such as an economy’s long-term growth – predictions derived from these models
have performed rather poorly when explaining events such as the recent financial crisis
(Rodrik, 2015, pgs. 102, 137). New Keynesian models, on the other hand, have performed
comparatively well in explaining both the recession and slow economic recovery after
the 2008 financial crisis. A recent University of Chicago-based survey asked leading
2For a more in depth review and critique of real business cycle models see Summers (1986).
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economists if the US stimulus policy in response to the global financial crisis reduced
unemployment (IGM Forum, 2015).3 Of those that responded, just 2 percent disagreed
with the statement that the policy reduced unemployment. That 2 percent entailed just
one respondent, Alberto Alesina, who was a strong champion for austerity in Europe.
Therefore, in the context of underemployment – the domain of much of this dissertation
– expansionary fiscal policies can most likely promote economic recoveries.
1.2 The Politics of Fiscal Policy
But if there is more or less agreement that fiscal expansions can promote a sustained
economic recovery, why do policymakers often resort to austerity measures before a robust
recovery has taken place? As previously mentioned, most studies of fiscal policy analyze
states as if they are isolated from the international system.4 Little research outside of
the ideational tradition examines how international economic interdependence shapes
policy outcomes. Other studies have analyzed budgetary variation in the context of
international events, such as wars or large scale economic downturns (Oatley, 2015; Jones
et al., 2014), but policy interdependence is not explored as a determinant of budgetary
policies. This dissertation seeks to integrate economic interdependence with theories of
domestic politics to provide a more systemic explanation for fiscal policy choice during
economic recessions and recoveries.
Chapter 2 begins with the observation that several nations responded to the Great
Recession of 2008-2009 with a coordinated fiscal stimulus, but then within a year quickly
reversed these policies and adopted austerity measures. I suggest that the international
dimensions of fiscal policy help to explain this behavior. As a stylized example, if the
United States were to engage in a fiscal expansion, at least some of this would result in
3The group released a similar survey with similar results in 2012.
4See Oatley (2011) and Cohen (2008) for a more in-depth critique of reductionist research designs.
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increased imports from Canada, thereby providing a stimulus for Canada. Furthermore,
Canada would not have to fund stimulus measures enacted in the United States. This
may create incentives for Canada to enact a smaller stimulus in response to a recession
than it might otherwise have done. Thus expectations regarding fiscal policies abroad are
likely to shape domestic fiscal policies. If a country expects that its major trade partners
are going to enact austerity measures, they may be less likely to engage in a stimulus at
home out of concern that much of the domestic stimulus will leak abroad. This may lead
to an equilibrium where states engage in austerity policies.
The model developed in Chapter 2 suggests that expectations may be formed by
observing whether a state’s major export markets are in recession or recovering from a
recession. The empirical evidence shows that when a state’s major export markets are
in recession, domestic policymakers may expect states to respond with stimulus policies.
However, when a state’s export markets are in recovery, austerity policies may be more
likely.
But are states likely to respond to recessions with stimulus policies as Chapter 2
implies? Following the 2008 financial crisis, countries such as Estonia and Latvia re-
sponded to the recession with austerity measures and the incumbent governments went
on to win reelection. Chapter 3, therefore, asks how states respond to recessions. I find
that the economic performance of a country’s export markets plays a role in determin-
ing whether policymakers choose to engage in expansionary or contractionary policies at
home. When a state’s export markets are performing well, policymakers tend to engage
in less expansionary, or even contractionary policies. Under these conditions, I find a
positive electoral effect for austerity policies. Conversely, when a state’s export markets
are performing poorly, policymakers are more likely to engage in fiscal stimulus and,
again, may be rewarded at the polls for these policies.
I argue this relationship exists because when a state’s export markets are performing
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well relative to the domestic economy, exports can pick up slack in the domestic economy
– contractionary policies can keep the real exchange rate low, thus making exports more
competitive internationally. But if a state’s export markets are performing poorly relative
to the domestic economy, an export-led recovery is unlikely feasible. Therefore, incum-
bents with electoral incentives to boost the economy by the next election are more likely
to engage in fiscal stimulus. In relation to chapter 2, countries that respond to recessions
with austerity tend to be performing quite poorly relative to their export markets. Thus
even if these countries were to enact stimulus policies, spillovers from any stimulus would
unlikely be sufficient to help other countries escape a recession. Therefore, policymakers
may still safely use as a heuristic that states generally respond to recessions with stimulus
policies.
The logic of chapters 2 and 3 largely discounts the role of interest groups, instead
focusing on the electoral incentives of elected officials. But we know that interest groups
affect a broad array of domestic policies (Olson, 1965). Chapter 4 explores how economic
interdependence can shape an interest group’s ability to influence policy across a wide
range of issue areas. Chapter 4 finds that when a state’s export markets are performing
well, firms in industries most likely to export, or what Frieden (1991, 2014) terms those
with “internationally-oriented” preferences, may gain the ability to influence policies over
those with more “domestically-oriented” preferences.
Chapter 4 argues that, in democracies, influence for firms may gain influence over a
wide range of policies through at least two major channels: revenue and employees. In-
creased revenue may be used to provide campaign contributions and fund other lobbying
efforts. Employers may also motivate their employees to mobilize for policies favorable
to the firm. I find that increased growth abroad is associated with a higher proportion
of employees employed in industries most likely to export. Similarly, among those most
likely to export, I find growth abroad to be associated with increased lobbying.
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1.3 Conclusion
This dissertation seeks to explain fiscal policy choice during recession and economic
recoveries. This focus is motivated by the fact that fiscal policies, such as austerity,
appear to have played a large role in contributing to a weak economic recovery throughout
the developed world. This anemic recovery has likely contributed to the rise of populist
governments (Blyth, 2013). Thus a deeper understanding fiscal policy choice is important
to our understanding of the contemporary international political economy.
Theoretically, this dissertation places economic interdependence at the center of its
analysis. To this point, most scholarship on fiscal policy choice tends to ignore interna-
tional factors, and how these factors may influence a domestic fiscal policy choice. But
the economics of fiscal policy clearly show that fiscal policy has clear international ele-
ments. By incorporating international factors into the analysis, this dissertation fills an
important gap in IPE scholarship.
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Chapter 2
From Stimulus to Austerity:
Expectations and Economic
Interdependence
2.1 Introduction
The developed world may struggle with economic stagnation long into the foreseeable
future. Seven years after the 2008 financial crisis, most advanced industrialized economies
had yet to recover their pre-crisis growth trend (Blanchard et al., 2015). The social costs
of stagnant recoveries following economic downturns can be enormous. Research has
linked slow recoveries to the rise of radical right political movements (Blyth, 2013) and
public health disasters such as increased depression and suicide rates (Stuckler and Basu,
2013). In several instances, politicians have successfully limited the depth and breadth
of recessions with expansionary fiscal policies (Drezner, 2014; Eichengreen, 2014). But
rather than maintaining expansionary policies until economic output has reached pre-
crisis levels, policymakers have often halted stimulus policies despite having the ability
9
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to maintain deficit spending.1 Following the 2008 financial crisis, for example, states
widely embraced expansionary fiscal policies, only to reverse course and adopt austerity
measures while their economies remained weak. Researchers have argued that premature
fiscal consolidation further decreases the likelihood that an economy will quickly recover
from an economic downturn, thus prolonging anemic economic growth (Blyth, 2013;
DeLong and Summers, 2012; Fata´s et al., 2015). Given the social and political costs
of weak recoveries, why do policymakers often begin fiscal consolidation before a robust
recovery has taken hold?
Current theories range from analyzing the material interests of voters and interest
groups (Gourevitch, 1986; Walter, 2013) to partisan ideology (Broz, 2013) and the role
of domestic institutions to explain fiscal policy outcomes (Alesina and Perotti, 1995).2
But in most instances, these factors – interests, institutions, and, in several cases, parti-
san ideology – remained constant as states shifted from stimulus to austerity and cannot,
therefore, provide a systematic explanation for these policy changes. Similarly, con-
structivist research argues that neoclassical ideology explains the widespread embrace of
austerity (Ban, 2015; Blyth, 2013; Chwieroth, 2010b; Helgado´ttir, 2015). But research
in this tradition struggles to explain the early embrace of Keynesian economic policies,
which are inconsistent with the neoclassical worldview.
This chapter argues that incumbents’ expectations of fiscal policy abroad shape fiscal
policy decisions at home. I argue that policymakers form beliefs about policies abroad
by considering the domestic politics of various fiscal policies. Domestically, because the
state of the economy often predicts an incumbent’s electoral fortunes, fiscal expansions
may be electorally beneficial because fiscal expansions can boost economic output and
reduce unemployment (Bartels, 2014; Chwieroth and Walter, 2014; Hibbs, 2000; Walter,
1This ability is largely dependent on debt to GDP ratios and the interest rates governments pay on
the their debt.
2Also see Kahler and Lake (2013) for several studies on the politics of economic crises.
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2013). But fiscal expansions, by definition, increase budget deficits and evidence suggests
that, holding the state of the economy constant, budget deficits can harm incumbents on
election day (Alesina et al., 1998; Brender and Drazen, 2008; Peltzman, 1992).3 Taken
together, these two sets of findings show that an electoral tension exists between fiscal
expansions and fiscal deficits. The empirical relationship between recessions and in-
cumbents losing office suggests that during recessions voters favor output over budget
deficits, which may make expansionary policies more likely during recessions. But when
the economy grows as the recovery begins, budget deficits gain electoral salience relative
to output. The electoral effects of fiscal deficits are likely amplified during the recov-
ery period because recessions tend to result in large accumulations of debt even before
accounting for discretionary fiscal policies (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Although these
empirical findings are seemingly contradictory – the same voters that favor fiscal expan-
sions may later punish incumbents for budget deficits – the notion of time inconsistent
preferences reconciles why voters may have differing policy preferences during recessions
and recoveries. But time inconsistent voting is insufficient to explain the speed of the
move from stimulus to austerity.
Incumbents likely consider potential fiscal policies abroad because these policies may
impact the domestic economy. Expansionary policies generally increase the demand
for goods and services produced abroad, resulting in increased imports (Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko, 2013; Hebous and Zimmermann, 2013). During the recovery period,
incumbents may seek to cut budget deficits and hope that continued growth abroad
picks up subsequent slack in domestic demand. Aware of this incentive, other countries
may follow suit by enacting contractionary policies of their own because they are unlikely
to favor funding expansionary policies that are muted by international spillovers. Even
3These studies do not argue in favor of a link between contractionary policies and growth, such as
Alesina and Ardagna (2009).
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if a single country would prefer to continue expansionary policies until the economy
recovered, the resulting increase in imports would dampen the stimulative effect of these
policies. Thus during the recovery period states end up in a prisoner’s dilemma type of
situation where the individually optimal policy is to enact contractionary policies, even
if states collectively may be better off maintaining expansionary policies.
These dynamics are analogous to those seen in scenarios involving public goods.
Generally, actors will contribute to public goods if the cost of further contribution is less
than the expected benefit from the good. The domestic benefits from fiscal expansions
abroad – unlike threshold goods such as lighthouses – vary depending on the size of
the fiscal expansion. If actors expect others not to provide to the public good then the
expected benefit of the good will fall accordingly and thus make contribution less likely.
This chapter argues that if a state expects others to engage in fiscal contractions, the
expected benefit of a fiscal expansion at home falls. Expansionary policies then become
less likely as the expected benefit falls.
I test this argument using cyclically adjusted budget balance data for 33 OECD
countries between 2000 and 2012.4 I then calculate the trade weighted proportion of
each country’s export markets that are either in a recession or a recovery and use this
as an indicator of fiscal policy expectations. But policymakers may set fiscal policies to
shape trade flows. I account for this potential reverse causality by employing a unique
instrumental variables approach, using the minimum distance between countries to in-
strument for trade flows. The empirical results provide convincing evidence that whether
a state’s trade partners are in a recession or in a recovery strongly predicts a state’s fiscal
policy in ways consistent with this chapter’s argument. The empirical results suggest that
international factors play an important yet under-appreciated role in our understanding
4This amounts to all OECD member countries except Estonia, which is removed from the sample
due to no data for the dependent variable.
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of budgetary policies.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Part two discusses how the
current literature explains variation in fiscal policy outcomes. Part three outlines how
fiscal policy spillovers can affect the strategic calculus of fiscal policy decisions. Part four
discusses the data and methods used to test the argument. Part five discusses the results.
Part six concludes with implications of this chapter’s results.
2.2 Budgetary Politics
Theories of economic voting argue that economic downturns tend to result in incum-
bents losing office (Bartels, 2014; Chwieroth and Walter, 2014; Hibbs, 2000). If incum-
bent politicians or parties seek reelection we would expect them to enact policies most
favorable to their reelection prospects. Following the 2008 financial crisis most countries
engaged in Keynesian deficit spending – at least for a time (Drezner, 2014). Evidence
suggests that incumbents in democratic states that enacted larger stimulus policies were
more likely to be reelected simply because the economies in these states improved faster
than those that did not enact stimulus policies (Bartels, 2014). Ideology only played a
peripheral role in determining states’ fiscal policy decisions (Bartels, 2014). In Germany,
for example, Angela Merkel’s government enacted one of Europe’s largest stimulus pro-
grams as a percentage of GDP (Blyth, 2013; Prasad and Sorkin, 2009). Regardless of
ideology, therefore, incumbents initially followed Keynesian policy prescriptions, presum-
ably under the belief that expansionary policies would be most likely to lead to a recovery
and, hence, their reelection. Although economists continue to debate the merits of fiscal
policy in promoting economic recovery from recessions, incumbents seem to believe that
fiscal policy is an effective tool to boost economic growth.5
5See supplementary file 1 for a brief overview of the economic debate on fiscal policy.
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Soon after the recovery process began, however, states quickly moved away from
expansionary policies. This policy shift may have been supported by the idea that
austerity policies would be expansionary (Alesina and Ardagna, 2009; Guajardo et al.,
2014). Scholars working in the ideational tradition have pointed toward the power of
economic ideas in shaping policy (Blyth, 2013; Chwieroth, 2010b; Helgado´ttir, 2015).
When these ideas are supported by politically influential actors they become more likely
to be adopted. Influential actors, such as those in the financial sector, supported the
retrenchment of the state in the economy and were also eager to lay blame on the state
for economic woes (Blyth, 2013; Stiglitz, 2016). But as Blyth (2013, pg. 54) notes, the
widespread embrace of fiscal stimulus in 2008 ran against neoclassical ideologies that
favor state retrenchment.
States did not turn away from stimulus policies until the recovery had begun in
several large economies such as the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Although Keynesian policies lasted for only about a year, that year marked a point where
most developed economies were facing severe recessions and the largest economies were
facing their deepest downturn of the global financial crisis. By 2010 recoveries had begun
throughout the OECD. Using this chapter’s definition of recession, defined in more detail
below, only seven of the 33 countries in the sample spent at least one quarter of 2010
in recession – the remaining countries were no longer in recession by 2010. Only Greece
saw no quarter of growth in 2010. By 2010, in other words, the deepest part of the 2008
recession had largely ended. Only when the recovery period began did states begin to
cut budget deficits.
At the very least, this time frame suggests that regardless of ideology, policymakers
may shift their worldviews on an ad hoc basis – adopting Keynesian-inspired policies
during recessions, but otherwise adopting more neoclassical-inspired policies. Although
ideas play an important role in economic policy, especially over the long run, the large
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stimulus policies enacted during the depth of the crisis were inconsistent with the long-
term ideational trend toward a smaller state throughout the developed world. During the
depth of the crisis, policymakers acted in ways consistent with their electoral interests
but against their purported ideologies. After the recovery began, policymakers embraced
austerity, a policy more in line with the ideologies that many had long promoted. This
inconsistency between political interests and ideational viewpoints suggests that ideas
alone do note suffice to explain these more short-term economic policy fluctuations –
even if ideas do well to explain long term policy trends.
Scholars often credit the G-20 for the coordinated stimulus in response to the cri-
sis. This coordination has been credited for helping the world to avoid another Great
Depression and maintaining an open global system (Drezner, 2014). But in 2010, with
economic growth still weak, G-20 governments agreed to reduce budget deficits to half of
their 2010 levels by 2013 (Calmes and Chan, 2010). Given that a weak economic recovery
may be just as damaging to the prospects for an open system as a deep recession (Blyth,
2013), the G-20 proved unable to sustain a coordinated stimulus in order to maintain a
stable global economic system.
The following section argues that the incentives of individual states lined up to fa-
cilitate expansionary policies during the recession, only to then promote contractionary
policies during the recovery. By this argument, the G-20 would have been much more
likely to succeed in pushing for a coordinated stimulus at the depth of the crisis than
during the recovery. Indeed, we might have observed the seemingly coordinated move
from stimulus to austerity regardless of the G-20’s efforts.
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2.3 Spillovers and Time Inconsistent Voters
Political economy research on fiscal policy generally focuses on domestic-level factors.
But fiscal policy has strong international dimensions because it impacts the demand for
imports and exports, regardless of the exchange rate regime. In the Mundell-Fleming
model a fiscal expansion may increase output in the domestic economy. But without
an accommodating monetary policy, this expansion drives up interest rates, which puts
pressure on the exchange rate to appreciate. If the currency is floating this appreciation
causes exports to fall and imports to rise – thus offering stimulative effects abroad.
Monetary authorities can accommodate a fiscal expansion at home by expanding the
money supply, thus keeping interest rates steady. As this accommodating policy may stop
the exchange rate from appreciating, a fiscal expansion will increase aggregate demand
in the domestic economy, which will boost demand for both domestic and foreign goods
and services. Alternatively, if the exchange rate is fixed, a fiscal stimulus will generally
boost domestic aggregate demand, again to the benefit of trade partners who will likely
see an increase in demand for their goods and services. These spillovers, or leakages, have
long been acknowledged in research on international economics (Kindleberger, 1949) and
were brought up in the context of the 2008 financial crisis by the OECD (2009).
But are these spillovers large enough to affect a state’s strategic calculus? Policymak-
ers in the United States clearly considered the spillover effects when passing the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act in response to the 2008 financial crisis. Worked into the
bill was a “buy America” provision, which stipulated that iron, steel, and manufactured
inputs to be used in stimulus-funded projects had to be produced in the United States,
with some exceptions. As Representatives Pete Visclosky and Tim Murphy wrote to
Congress on behalf of the Congressional Steel Caucus:
“Recently, under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, it was an-
16
From Stimulus to Austerity: Expectations and Economic Interdependence Chapter 2
nounced that certain renewable energy tax credits allowed American com-
panies to use tax credits to import manufactured goods. Specifically, an
American company stated that it would form a joint venture with a Chinese
company to build a 36,000 acre wind farm in Texas. That project would have
utilized – and still could – Chinese wind turbines, creating over 2,000 jobs in
China” (Visclosky, 2010).
Noting that the US stimulus project could create jobs in China, this statement pro-
vides evidence that policymakers are aware of how expansionary fiscal policies may boost
employment abroad to the detriment of jobs at home. These considerations are not with-
out merit – much research in economics shows that the effects of fiscal policy spillovers
from one country have substantive impacts on domestic output elsewhere.6 Recent re-
search has shown that the fiscal multiplier – how much a $1 increase in government
spending increases total output – is larger during downturns and weak recoveries than
during periods of economic growth (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012). Similarly, the
multiplier effect from fiscal policy spillovers between two countries is also larger if both
countries have unemployment above the “natural” rate – or if they are in recessions or
the early stages of recoveries (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013). Recent studies of
the eurozone have shown that, because of this larger multiplier, countries that coordi-
nate fiscal policies in response to a common economic shock, would each have to enact
a substantially smaller stimulus policy to recoup the fall in aggregate demand than if
they were to enact uncoordinated policies (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013; Hebous
and Zimmermann, 2013). Therefore, the economic effects of fiscal policy spillovers are
substantial.
Because fiscal expansions must eventually be financed, they are costly to enact and
6For estimates of the size of these spillover effects on GDP, see OECD (2009). Evidence of fiscal
policy spillovers also exists across regions in the United States (Dupor and McCrory, 2014).
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maintain. Recessions, especially those with roots in the banking and financial sector,
almost always result in large budget deficits (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Sovereign debt
accumulates during recessions simply because governments receive less tax revenue as
incomes fall while also having to provide more social services, such as unemployment
benefits. These debts accumulate even before taking into account policies such as bank
bailouts and other discretionary budgetary policies that further add to a government’s
debt load. But stimulus policies in foreign markets do not need to be financed domesti-
cally. If politicians seek to maximize the benefits of fiscal policies while minimizing the
costs, they may prefer actors abroad to enact stimulus policies rather than enacting a
domestic stimulus at home. Thus politicians may be expected to consider the policies
most likely to be enacted abroad. But what policies are politicians abroad most likely to
enact?
Following the 2008 financial crisis, states that enacted more expansionary policies in-
creased their likelihood of reelection simply because these policies boosted the domestic
economy (Bartels, 2014). Therefore, incumbents seem to benefit electorally from fiscal
expansions following a recession. But if electoral pressures encourage one state to au-
tomatically respond to a recession with a large fiscal expansion, its trade partners may
consider free riding on the spillovers of these policies and not enact an expansion of their
own. However, as more countries enter into recession, the benefits of domestic fiscal
expansions grow relative to freeriding on fiscal expansions abroad for several reasons.
First, as already noted, fiscal policy spillovers and the larger fiscal multiplier during
recessions suggest that each nation would have to enact a smaller fiscal expansion to
recoup the decline in aggregate demand caused by a recession than if only one state were
to enact a stimulus (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013). In the language of public
goods, this suggests that states would have to contribute less in order to receive a larger
benefit during weak economic growth than during periods of expansion. Second, if a state
18
From Stimulus to Austerity: Expectations and Economic Interdependence Chapter 2
is in a recession, spillovers from other states’ fiscal policies are unlikely to be sufficient
to bring a state out of a recession. If a state’s export markets are also in recession,
fiscal expansions enacted in an effort to regain losses in aggregate demand are unlikely
to sufficiently spillover to bring foreign economies out of recession. Third, if a state is
not in recession, downturns abroad may push the country toward a recession, or at the
very least weaken the domestic economy. This could lead election-oriented incumbents
to preempt a recession at home with more expansionary policies. Thus even if states do
not uniformly respond to domestic recessions with stimulus policies – as they do not –
policymakers abroad may still engage in expansionary policies of their own to avoid also
falling into recession. Therefore, policymakers are unlikely to try to benefit from fiscal
policy spillovers when their trade partners are in recession and may be more likely to
pass stimulus policies of their own.
But the incentives to maintain expansionary fiscal policies may prove short lived. Ex-
pansionary policies become less politically sustainable as the debt servicing costs grow.
Although the accumulation of debt may be necessary to spur a recovery – and premature
austerity may end up increasing debt to GDP ratios if GDP falls faster than debt – oppo-
sition parties can use these increasing debt loads to label the incumbent party as fiscally
irresponsible.7 These labels may have substantial electoral effects. Empirical evidence
shows that budget deficits, with the state of the economy held constant, harms incum-
bents’ reelection prospects (Alesina et al., 1998; Brender and Drazen, 2008; Peltzman,
1992). Brender and Drazen (2008) not only find that budget deficits over the length of
an incumbent’s term reduce their likelihood of reelection, but improved fiscal balances
increase the likelihood of being reelected. Therefore, incumbents focused on reelection
are likely to opposed large budget deficits throughout their term and may actively seek
7There is clearly a limit on the amount of debt a government can run before investors begin demanding
much higher rates of interest on debt, but it is unclear where this limit is.
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to reduce accumulated debts.
The empirical findings on the relationship between stimulus policies, budget deficits,
and reelection, although supported in a wide range of studies, seem to be contradictory:
why would voters punish incumbents for both downturns and any budget deficits built
up to escape downturns? The time inconsistency problem reconciles this apparent con-
tradiction. During recessions, unemployment tends to rise as does uncertainty regarding
future employment, leading voters to prefer policies designed to boost employment. But
as the economy begins to recover, unemployment generally falls. Under the context of
falling unemployment voters may move toward favoring lower budget deficits under the
premise that taxes will be lower in the future. In both contexts voters care primarily
about their economic well being, but what they prefer during recessions differs from what
they prefer during recoveries.8
Although reducing budget deficits comes with the trade-off of potentially dampening
recovery efforts, recent research suggests that voters may care more about the rate of
change in the economy over the previous year rather than the absolute level of GDP or
growth over the full length of an incumbent’s term (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Bartels,
2014; Huber et al., 2012). Thus on the domestic level, incumbents may fairly presume
that they have better electoral prospects when the economy is growing, albeit slowly,
than when it is in recession. With better electoral prospects incumbents may succumb
to pressure to begin rolling back these expansionary policies in an effort to gain any elec-
toral benefits from fiscal consolidation efforts. On the international level, as economic
performance abroad improves, incumbents may hope that growth abroad will help to
support their own domestic recovery and, at least potentially, offset their own contrac-
tionary policies. Although it remains uncertain whether voters place more total emphasis
8Much research has shown that the time inconsistency problem causes commitment problems for
leaders (Broz, 2002; Fearon, 1995). A broad literature in behavioral economics also shows that individuals
face similar time inconsistencies in various consumption or savings decisions (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
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on budget deficits than on growth during recoveries, evidence suggests that the role of
budget deficits becomes more salient relative to growth during recoveries than during
recessions (Achen and Bartels, 2016). Taking advantage of growth abroad may allow
incumbents to gain electoral support through both economic growth and budget deficit
reduction.
But policymakers abroad are likely aware of these incentives. Because stimulus money
leaks abroad, the positive effect is muted if other countries do not reciprocate with
expansionary policies of their own. Even if an incumbent would prefer to maintain
expansionary policies, others would have an incentive to free ride on the spillovers from
these policies. Unlike during recessions, therefore, policymakers end up in a prisoner’s
dilemma during the recovery period where incentives push toward contractionary policies.
The above logic is developed formally in supplementary file 2. This argument offers
two key testable implications. First, when an incumbent believes states abroad will
enact expansionary policies, they are more likely to enact fiscal expansions of their own.
Incumbents are likely to expect policymakers abroad to pursue fiscal expansions if these
countries are in recession. Even if states do not uniformly respond to recessions with
expansionary policies, an expansion at home may prevent recessions abroad from leading
the domestic economy into recession. Thus a heuristic that countries will respond to
recessions with fiscal expansions may still prove politically beneficial for policymakers.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Domestic fiscal policies become more expansionary as more of a
state’s trade partners are in recession.
Second, after recessions have ended, the electoral benefits of expansionary policies
are likely to decline through two channels. First, the opposition is likely to use any large
buildup of debt as evidence of bad governance. Because time inconsistent voters may
agree with these accusations, election-oriented politicians have reason to seek to mitigate
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the effect of these accusations. Third, as the economy begins to grow the electoral incen-
tive to further boost growth falls – weak growth is less electorally harmful than economic
decline. Both of these pressures are likely to become more salient during the recovery
period, where large government debts have already accumulated and electoral incentives
to end the recession have abated. Aware of these incentives, domestic policymakers may
expect officials abroad to begin cutting budget deficits. If a state’s trade partners cut
spending, stimulus dollars at home will likely leak abroad in the form of increased spend-
ing on imports, making fiscal stimulus at home less effective and thus less attractive for
domestic policymakers. This leads to a second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Domestic fiscal policies become more contractionary as more of a
state’s trade partners are in economic recovery.
2.4 Data and Methods
The empirical analysis focuses on OECD countries from 2000 to 2012. Although
OECD states trade with, and likely consider the fiscal policies of, states outside the
OECD, I limit the analysis to OECD countries for several reasons. First is data avail-
ability. Second is that the theory developed in this chapter considers how electoral
politics shape expectations of fiscal policy. The adjustment process may work differently
for non-democracies. The post 2000 time period is one where fiscal policy is likely to have
played a more central role in policymakers’ strategic calculus as compared with earlier
years. Fiscal policy must play a more central role relative to monetary policy in pro-
moting a recovery when real interest rates approach the zero lower bound; real interest
rates have been trending downward since the late 1990s (King and Low, 2014; Summers,
2015). But, because the time frame of analysis is relatively short, I also extend the time
period from 1980 to 2012 as a robustness check. The results, which are available in the
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supplementary files, largely hold.
This chapter posits that various stages of the business cycle in more interdependent
markets affect policymakers’ strategic fiscal policy calculations. This requires distin-
guishing between recession and recovery. I use the popular definition of a recession as
two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth. This is similar to the method used
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2014), who use annual changes of GDP per capita to define
recessions and recoveries. Following Kannan et al. (2014) I define the recovery period
as lasting until either real GDP returns to its prerecession level or the economy falls
back into another recession. After an economy returns to its prerecession level, or the
economy enters a period of expansion and the recovery is complete. Although focusing
on GDP may ignore other important aspects of the economy, economists have long noted
the negative correlation between economic growth and unemployment, which is often
termed ”Okun’s Law.”
2.4.1 Capturing Interdependence
Fiscal policy spillovers – and the incentive for policymakers to consider fiscal policy
strategically – are likely more pronounced between states with higher levels of bilateral
trade. Bilateral trade is the most appropriate domain for this study’s empirical analysis
because the effects of fiscal policy spillovers are hypothesized to be transmitted through
their impact on imports and exports. Although bilateral trade data may be treated
as dyadic, the assumption that each dyad is independent may lead to biased statistical
inferences.9 I use spatial econometrics to account for these interdependencies.
The IMF direction of trade statistics provides data for total exports and imports
of merchandise between countries. These data are in matrix form, where each cell ij
indicates the US dollar amount of exports from country i to country j. I subset these
9See Cranmer and Desmarais (ming) for a more in-depth critique of dyadic research designs.
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data to OECD countries, which make up this chapter’s analysis. To calculate the level
of bilateral trade between countries i and j I take the sum of the direction of trade
matrix and its transpose. Because bilateral trade likely becomes more salient as it grows
proportional to a country’s GDP, I divide each country i’s level of bilateral trade with all
countries j by country i’s GDP.10 This matrix is defined as the connectivity matrix, W .
Because the amount of trade between countries varies with time, this matrix is in the
form of an NT by NT block diagonal, where each block represents a year and zeros make
up the main diagonal. This construction also captures any shifts in trade flows between
countries over time. In other words, if trade relations among countries shift between year
t and year t+ 1, the matrix will automatically account for such changes.
I use a spatial lag model to capture, and control for, the direct effects of interdepen-
dence. Spatial lag models are defined as the weighted average of the dependent variable
in all countries j to which country i connects (Chaudoin et al., 2015; Elkins and Sim-
mons, 2005; Ward and Gleditsch, 2008). This spatial lag variable controls for the effects
that a state’s trade partners’ fiscal policies have on domestic fiscal policy decisions. This
variable also captures time dynamics and the effect of one state acting before another.
To calculate this variable, I row standardize W , which creates a weight, and multiply
W by a vector B, which is the dependent variable for every state in every year. This
variable is denoted as Spatial Primary Balance. In the remainder of this section, italics
denote each variable’s label in the regression output tables.
I use a similar technique to measure the effects of economic performance abroad.
First, I measure the length of time, in quarters, each state spends in economic recession
and recovery for each year in the sample. I then put these data in an N × 2 matrix and
multiply it by the above, row standardized connectivity matrix W . This produces an
N × 2 matrix, where the two vectors in this matrix contain the weighted average of the
10Both bilateral trade and GDP are measured in US dollars.
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time spent in economic recession and recovery, respectively, for all states j with which
state i trades. Additional countries in recession, or recovery, will increase the value of
these variables. But increasing the length of time a country is in recession or recovery
will also increase the values of these variables. Therefore, as a robustness check, I include
a dichotomous variable for each year a country experiences a recession or a recovery,
rather than the discrete variable that calculates the number of quarters each country has
consecutively spent in recession and recovery. Using a dichotomous variable serves to
calculate country i’s trade weighted proportion of trade partners in either recession or
recovery. The estimates associated with these variables are denoted as either Recession
Abroad or Recovery Abroad with a distinction between whether the variable is referring to
the total number of quarters or the trade weighted proportion of a state’s trade partners
in recession or recovery.
2.4.2 Dependent Variable
To measure fiscal policies one cannot simply analyze changes in the budget balance,
or revenues and expenditures, because recessions tend to deepen fiscal deficits even if
states are enacting contractionary fiscal policies. For example, revenues may fall even
if states increase taxes in response to recessions. To measure fiscal policy I use the
cyclically adjusted Primary Balance, which adjusts for business cycle fluctuations. Fiscal
expansions are associated with lower values and fiscal contractions are associated with
higher values of the cyclically adjusted primary balance. Data for this variable come from
the IMF Fiscal Monitor. I lead this variable one period because fiscal policies have time
lags before they go into effect (Borg et al., 2014). Changes to taxes or spending enacted
in one year will largely be seen in the following year’s budget balance. For example, in
the United States the fiscal year begins in October. Factors that effect budget decisions
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will occur before October, but their impact on the budget will mostly be observed the
following year.
Although fiscal expansions may be obtained through increasing spending or decreasing
taxes, both will have the net result of a fall in the adjusted primary balance. The opposite
is true for fiscal contractions. Several domains for government spending exist, but all
result in increased budget deficits. Empirical macroeconomic models that are often used
to analyze the effects of fiscal policies tend to focus on the aggregate fiscal policy outcomes
rather than on the specific type of fiscal policies enacted. For example, a recent study
by IMF researchers that surveyed the literature on fiscal consolidation shows that the
cyclically adjusted primary balance is among the most common measures for fiscal policy
(Escolano et al., 2014).11 A more detailed measure of fiscal policy, which includes changes
in taxes versus spending may be desirable, but this chapter is interested in the process
that determines the overall fiscal responses to recessions and recoveries abroad, not the
composition of these policies. Furthermore, existing data on expenditures and revenues
are not cyclically adjusted, meaning these measures may fluctuate due to the business
cycle rather than explicit policy choices.
2.4.3 Control Variables
States may face constraints on their fiscal policy decisions. Because fiscal policy is
the main tool used to stabilize the accumulation of debt (Alesina and Ardagna, 2009;
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010), I include a variable for the gross Debt to GDP Ratio of
each country in the sample. This variable also accounts for the fact that countries with
surpluses can more easily enact expansionary policies than those with large budget deficits
(Cameron, 2012). But several rich countries, notably Japan, have long maintained large
11Only a small minority of the papers surveyed in Escolano et al. (2014) distinguish between taxes
and spending in their measures of fiscal consolidation.
26
From Stimulus to Austerity: Expectations and Economic Interdependence Chapter 2
budget deficits without having to pay high interest rates. Therefore, I include a variable
for long term Interest Rate Spreads relative to the United States. This follows from a
previous study that showed that long term interest rate spreads were the best predictor
of austerity in Europe following the 2008 financial crisis (Armingeon, 2012). Data for
these variables come from the IMF World Economic Outlook.
To control for the effects of wealthier countries being less constrained in their fiscal
policy decisions than poorer countries (Rudra, 2002; Wibbels, 2006), I include a variable
for logged GDP Per Capita. The level of Trade Openness also likely affect fiscal policy
decisions. Countries that are more closed to trade are less likely to be impacted by
fiscal policy spillovers. This variable is operationalized as total imports plus exports as
a percentage of GDP.
Inflation also affects fiscal policy decisions because government spending may further
increase consumer prices. Countries facing inflationary pressure may therefore be less
likely to enact fiscal stimulus. To control for this potential confounding relationship I
include a variable for the annual change in the inflation rate. Furthermore, central banks
may seek to increase the money supply as a method of boosting the economy, thus serving
as a substitute for fiscal policy. To control for this effect I include a variable for M2. Both
of these variables come from the World Bank.
I also control for potentially confounding political variables. The Eurozone imposes
constraints on fiscal policies in member states. Therefore, I include a dummy variable
where each country in the eurozone takes the value of one for each year they are mem-
bers.12
The partisan ideology of a government on a traditional left-right continuum may be
associated with budget deficits. For instance, Broz (2013) finds that right parties are
12This variable is time invariant for most countries over the time period in the sample. It therefore is
absorbed into the country fixed effects. However, the robustness check that extends the sample provides
insignificant estimates for this variable.
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associated with larger budget deficits than left parties. Therefore, I include a variable –
Partisan Orientation of Exec. – for the partisan orientation of the executive where 1 is
right, 2 is center, and 3 is left.
I include a variable, Vetoes, that captures the number of veto players in each country’s
political system. The number of veto players is negatively associated with the ability of
governments to pass legislation (Solingen, 2012; Tsebelis, 1995). However, the effect
of vetoes also depends on the level of fragmentation within the government – if one
party controls most of the government veto players are unlikely to have much of an
effect. Therefore, I include a variable, Legislative Frac., that captures the proportion of
legislative seats held by the governing party. Larger values indicate that the governing
party controls are larger portion of the legislature.
Stemming from the political business cycles literature (Hibbs, 1977), one may argue
that the number of years a leader has in office before an election is negatively associ-
ated with budget deficits. In most democracies, elections are endogenously determined;
leaders are likely to strategically call elections Kayser (2005). Leaders that have been in
office longer may strategically call early elections, or try to delay an election until the
economy improves. To capture the possible effect of politicians strategically considering
the timing of their elections, I include a variable for the number of years remaining until
the subsequent election for the executive as well as a variable for the number of years the
executive has held office. The data for these political variables come from an updated
version of Beck et al. (2001). These variables are labeled Years to Next Exec. Election
and Years Exec. in Office respectively. To control for a time trend I include a cubic poly-
nomial, although I do not present the results for each time variable. Summary statistics
for these variables are provided in the Appendix.
An alternative explanation for this chapter’s hypothesis is that recessions abroad may
cause domestic recessions. This may lead politicians to enact fiscal expansions to recover
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from a recession emanating from abroad. Thus recessions abroad have an indirect effect
on domestic fiscal policy. To control for this possibility I include a variable for the annual
percent change in Real GDP. If a recession abroad caused a domestic recession – which
would be observed through a change in real GDP – then we would expect this variable
to pick up the effect of a recession, or a recovery, abroad on domestic fiscal policy and
the estimated effect of a recession abroad would tend toward zero (Achen, 2005). I also
include a control variable for the number of quarters the domestic economy has spent
in a recession and a recovery for each year, these are labeled Domestic Recession and
Domestic Recovery in the table of regression output.
2.5 Empirical Technique and Results
By definition, economic recoveries cannot exist without recessions. Because of this
causal relationship, I estimate separate models for hypotheses one and two. I lead the
dependent variable one period because budgets passed in one year do not generally af-
fect primary balances until the next year, as discussed above. Formally, I estimate the
following model:
Bi,t+1 = αi + γWi,tBi,t + ρWi,tRi,t +
n∑
k=1
βkXk,i,t + εi,t (2.1)
Where i indexes country and t indexes year. The dependent variable, B, is the
cyclically adjusted primary balance. The first parameter, α, captures the time invariant,
country-specific effect to account for unit-specific heterogeneity. W is a spatial weight
matrix that captures the level of bilateral trade between each country for each year.13 B
denotes each country’s cyclically adjusted primary balance in year t. R is a variable for
recessions or recoveries abroad. X is a vector of control variables, with k indexing the n
13Recall this is constructed as an NT ×NT block matrix where each block represents time t.
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control variables.
However, a potential problem with using trade weighted economic factors to predict
fiscal policy is potential reverse causality. Fiscal policies may be used as a tool to foster
trade between countries – indeed, this chapter’s argument is predicated on this premise.
In other words, W may be endogenous. To account for this problem I use a two stage
least squares instrumental variables approach.
I use the minimum distance between countries to instrument for trade between them.
A well known model in international trade, the gravity model, shows that trade is in-
versely proportional to geographic distance (Anderson, 2011; Feyrer, 2009). Geography
causes countries to trade more, but it is highly unlikely that trade, fiscal policy, or other
potentially omitted economic variables cause countries to be geographically close. Data
for minimum distance between states come from Weidmann et al. (2010).
In the first stage of the regression I use a matrix of minimum distance between states,
D, to instrument for trade between states, W . Although distance between states is time
invariant, the minimum distance matrix, D, is matrix-multiplied by R, which captures
either the trade weighted duration or trade weighted proportion state i’s trade partners
are either in recession or recovery.14 Because R is time variant the vectors produced by
multiplying D×R are also time variant. Therefore, distance can be used as an instrument
for trade and the model can still be estimated with country fixed effects. The results for
the first stage regression are shown in supplementary file 3.
Table 2.1 presents the results. Models 5 through 8 are reduced-form specifications of
models 1 through 4,, as recommended by Achen (2005). The reduced-form specification
also serves to reduce the amount of missing data.15
Recall that hypothesis one predicts that recessions abroad will be associated with
14In other words, R is an n×4 matrix, but each variable, or column, is estimated in a separate model.
15This table, and those in the Appendix are constructed using modifications from Hlavac (2015).
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Table 2.1: Fiscal Policy as a Function of Recessions and Recoveries Abroad
Dependent variable:
Primary Balancet+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Primary Balance 0.685∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.047) (0.044) (0.051) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039)
Spatial Primary Balance −0.218 0.366∗∗ −0.223 0.424∗∗∗ −0.113 0.318∗∗∗ −0.120 0.329∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.167) (0.155) (0.157) (0.084) (0.085) (0.084) (0.103)
Recession Abroad −0.393∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗
(Weighted Total Quarters) (0.136) (0.048)
Recovery Abroad 0.714∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
(Weighted Total Quarters) (0.122) (0.076)
Recession Abroad −1.931∗∗∗ −1.433∗∗∗
(Weighted Proportion) (0.424) (0.194)
Recovery Abroad 3.712∗∗∗ 2.009∗∗∗
(Weighted Proportion) (0.669) (0.552)
Change Real GDP −0.071 −0.040 −0.095∗∗ 0.089∗∗
(0.048) (0.043) (0.047) (0.044)
Domestic Recession 0.124 0.208∗∗ 0.138 0.165∗
(Total Quarters) (0.099) (0.090) (0.096) (0.098)
Domestic Recovery −0.037 −0.052 −0.054 −0.041
(Total Quarters) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.029)
Trade Openness 0.012 0.020∗ 0.017 0.021∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Inflation −0.014 0.076 0.022 0.143∗∗
(0.057) (0.060) (0.058) (0.064)
M2 −0.011 −0.010 −0.011 −0.012∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
GDP Per Capita (Logged) 0.217 0.041 0.263 0.683
(0.788) (0.861) (0.740) (0.892)
Debt to GDP Ratio 0.037∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
Interest Rate Spread 0.196∗∗ 0.212∗∗ 0.158 0.214∗∗
(0.099) (0.095) (0.097) (0.102)
Partisan Orientation of Exec. −0.0001 0.014 −0.003 0.030
(0.111) (0.101) (0.107) (0.095)
Years Exec. in Office 0.099∗ 0.075 0.094∗ 0.088
(0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.053)
Years to Next Exec. Election 0.083 0.095∗ 0.092∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.056) (0.053) (0.052) (0.058)
Vetoes 0.179 0.137 0.151 0.161
(0.142) (0.132) (0.141) (0.108)
Legislative Frac. 0.539 −0.335 0.505 −1.311
(1.592) (1.712) (1.529) (1.593)
Observations 344 344 344 344 415 415 415 415
R2 0.672 0.655 0.690 0.669 0.589 0.587 0.604 0.594
Adjusted R2 0.574 0.560 0.590 0.572 0.534 0.532 0.547 0.539
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
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expansionary fiscal policies, or have a negative effect on the cyclically adjusted primary
balance. Hypothesis two predicts that recoveries abroad will be associated with more
contractionary fiscal policies, observed as a positive effect on the cyclically adjusted
primary balance.
The models provide strong support for the first hypothesis. The estimates for the
number of a country’s trade partners that are in recession are negative and statistically
significant in every model. The size of the coefficients suggest that these results are also
substantively significant. Model one shows that as the trade weighted average number
of quarters a country’s trade partners spend in recession increases by one quarter, the
domestic cyclically adjusted primary balance falls by .393 as a percent of GDP.16 In other
words, countries tend to enact larger fiscal stimulus policies when their trade partners
spend more time in recessions. This is the relationship we would expect if countries were
more likely to enact expansionary fiscal policies if they expected their trade partners to
also enact expansionary policies.
The models also provide consistent support for the second hypothesis. The estimates
for the number of a country’s export market, weighted by trade flows, that are in re-
covery are positive and statistically significant in every model. These results are also
substantively significant. Model two shows that increasing the trade-weighted number
of quarters a country’s trade partners spend in economic recovery by one quarter is as-
sociated with a 0.714 percent increase in the cyclically adjusted budget balance. This
suggests that more contractionary fiscal policies are associated with a larger number of a
state’s trade partners in economic recovery. This effect holds independent of the ability
of states to spend countercyclically, measured by debt to GDP ratios and interest rate
spreads, which suggests that this result is unlikely an artifact of a state having run up
large budget deficits during a recession.
16Recall that the trade weighted value is predicted by the first stage equation.
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Comparing the substantive effect of different variables, Model 1 shows that a one stan-
dard deviation increase in interest rate spreads is associated with a 0.486 percent increase
in a state’s cyclically adjusted budget balance.17 The sign and significance of this effect
is consistent with previous scholarship (Armingeon, 2012; Cameron, 2012). In contrast,
a one standard deviation increase in the length of time a country’s trade partners spend
in recession is associated with a 0.422 percent decrease in a state’s cyclically adjusted
primary balance – nearly enough to offset the effect of interest rate spreads. From the
estimates in Model 2, a one standard deviation increase in the interest rate spread is as-
sociated with a 0.526 increase in the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percentage
of GDP, while a one standard deviation increase in the length of time a country’s trade
partners spend in recovery is associated with a 1.007 percent increase in the cyclically
adjusted primary balance in the following year – nearly twice the effect. Therefore, the
effect of a state’s trade partners in recession or recovery plays a substantively strong role
compared with the interest that governments pay on their debt.
These results are unlikely to be capturing the fact that the Great Recession began
with states enacting an expansionary fiscal policy and then simply began to slowly unwind
these policies. All of the models control for the length of time a state spends in both
recession and recovery as well as the annual percent change in real GDP. The inclusion
of a cubic polynomial controls for other broad trends from stimulus to austerity across
OECD countries in response to the 2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, the results are
unlikely due to the fact that countries are importing recessions from abroad, as the
results hold despite controlling for the number of quarters states spends in recession and
recovery as well as their change in real GDP.
Overall the results provide strong support for this chapter’s argument. Domestic fiscal
policies become more expansionary as more of a state’s trade partners are in a recession.
17Standard deviations, along with other summary statistics, are available in Appendix 1.
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Domestic fiscal policies become contractionary as more of a state’s trade partners enter
a recovery. This relationship is consistent with the argument that policymakers use the
state of economies abroad as a heuristic to infer, and strategically respond to, the likely
fiscal policies in these economies. Even if states abroad do not uniformly respond to
economic recessions with stimulus policies, behaving as if they do may be the electorally
optimal response for domestic policymakers. The empirical results suggest that domestic
fiscal policy is, in part, a function of the expected fiscal policies abroad.
2.6 Conclusion
Since the end of the Great Recession, anemic economic recoveries have wreaked havoc
on the livelihoods of millions of people throughout the developed world. Economic stag-
nation, which may be defined as an unusually long period of recovery, threatens the
developed world with a future of low-growth, similar to the experience of Japan over
the last 25 years. Despite these social costs, policymakers have generally responded to
these slow recoveries with contractionary fiscal policies that may well have worsened the
prospect of a sustained recovery (DeLong and Summers, 2012; Fata´s et al., 2015). This
chapter introduces the argument that fiscal policy spillovers lead states to strategically
consider international implications of fiscal policy. Despite incentives that may encourage
short-term expansionary policies during recessions, fiscal policy spillovers push policies
to become more contractionary during the recovery process.
This chapter makes several important contributions. The first is methodological.
Although research using spatial econometrics has become much more common, little, if
any, directly confronts the problem of a potentially endogenous weight matrix. Franzese
and Hays (2007), for example, discuss the use of instrumental variables when the right
hand side regressors other than the weight matrix are endogenous, but not when the
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weight matrix is itself potentially a function of the dependent variable. The approach in
this chapter extends a technique that is widely used in traditional statistical analysis to
spatial econometrics.
This chapter also provides three contributions to our understanding of budgetary pol-
itics. First, to this point, most research concentrates on the short-term policy responses
to recessions. Little research extends the analysis to consider the political implications
of fiscal policy later in the business cycle. In addition to recessions, this chapter also
analyzes fiscal policy in response to recoveries. Second, this chapter further considers
the international determinants of fiscal policy decisions. This international dimension
not only helps explain why policymakers may prematurely end expansionary fiscal poli-
cies, but also provides insights into why policymakers responded to the Great Recession
with coordinated fiscal expansions. Third, economists have been seriously considering
the premise that the developed world is facing “secular stagnation” – long term slow
economic growth (Eggertsson and Mehrotra, 2014; Gordon, 2016; Summers, 2013, 2015;
Teulings and Baldwin, 2014). Slow recoveries have amplified this trend, the term of
which was first coined by Alvin Hansen in the 1930s to explain the slow recovery from
the Great Depression. Given that cooperation between nations can likely help avert this
undesirable outcome, political science and international relations has much to contribute
to the subject, but, to this point, the field has been mute.
This chapter also offers implications for theories of fiscal policy coordination. By sim-
ply assuming policymakers are election-oriented and that spillovers lead them to strate-
gically consider the likely fiscal policies abroad, we may observe an equilibrium where
states engage in harmonious fiscal expansions during recessions without explicit coordi-
nation. These same assumptions lead to an equilibrium where states roll back these fiscal
expansions after a recession has subsided, but before a robust recovery has taken hold.
This chapter offers a novel explanation for states may move from stimulus to austerity
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before a robust recovery had taken hold.
Scholars have noted that anemic economic growth, or stagnant recoveries, has in the
past pushed countries away from an open, liberal order (Blyth, 2013). Indeed, spillovers
are less of an issue if states enact high trade barriers. Although weak recoveries are likely
undesirable for incumbent politicians seeking reelection – and for the prospects of an
open economic system – strategic interaction between states may lead to an equilibrium
where states enact contractionary fiscal policies during the recovery period. Because
expectations of contractionary policies abroad lead to this equilibrium, manipulating
these expectations may allow states to maintain fiscal expansions throughout the recovery
process. If fiscal policy authorities can credibly commit to maintaining unemployment
under a maximum level then leaders in other states may come to expect that their trade
partners will maintain fiscal expansions during the recovery process when unemployment
remains relatively high. This may lead states to simultaneously enact fiscal expansions,
and simultaneous fiscal expansions provide the most stimulus per dollar spent (Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko, 2013). Therefore, shifting the expectations of fiscal policy abroad
may lead to a sustained, robust economic recovery.
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2.7 Summary Statistics of Variables in Regression
The summary statistics below are for the variables in Table 2.1. The variables with
the subscript pred denote the predicted values for these variables based on models one
through four in Table 2.3.
Table 2.2
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Primary Balance 448 −2.546 3.287 −19.106 5.876
Spatial Primary Balance 448 −2.911 1.302 −8.357 0.379
Recession Abroad (Total Quarters) 476 0.845 1.138 0.0002 4.860
Recession Abroad (Total Quarters)pred 346 0.79 1.075 −0.604 4.104
Recovery Abroad (Total Quarters) 476 1.303 1.586 0.000 6.326
Recovery Abroad (Total Quarters)pred 346 1.242 1.411 −1.048 5.509
Recession Abroad (Proportion) 476 0.281 0.318 0.0001 0.982
Recession Abroad (Proportion)pred 346 0.275 0.293 −0.216 0.987
Recovery Abroad (Proportion) 476 0.266 0.301 0.000 0.978
Recovery Abroad (Proportion)pred 346 0.256 0.285 −0.213 0.942
Change Real GDP 475 2.235 3.103 −14.738 10.494
Domestic Recession 476 0.920 1.935 0 16
Domestic Recovery 476 1.134 2.590 0 17
Trade Openness 466 91.293 53.296 20.258 346.372
Inflation 466 3.147 4.573 −4.480 54.915
M2 451 8.584 12.640 −25.343 121.924
Eurozone 476 0.370 0.483 0 1
GDP Per Capita (Log) 476 10.157 0.716 8.025 11.627
Debt to GDP 474 57.631 38.191 3.646 243.203
Interest Rate Spread 448 −1.184 2.480 −12.859 4.829
Partisan Orientation of Exec. 428 1.769 1.045 0 3
Years Exec. in Office 441 1.791 1.246 0 5
Years to Next Exec. Election 429 3.923 2.691 1 17
Vetoes 441 4.029 1.145 2 8
Legislative Frac. 429 0.551 0.096 0.255 0.891
Formal Model
To illustrate the logic of this chapter’s argument, I develop a simple game theoretic
model using a Bayesian-Nash solution concept. The model here assumes both parties act
simultaneously and independently. In reality states do not enact fiscal policy simultane-
ously. But, partially due to time lags, credibly committing to fiscal policies is difficult;
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states may announce a fiscal policy only to change it later (Borg et al., 2014). If one state
announces a fiscal policy before another, it simply adds information for other states and
they can adjust their prior probabilities of another state’s fiscal policy, which is consistent
with the model. The empirical analysis more thoroughly addresses time lags. Although
expansionary and contractionary policies vary by level, I make the simplifying assump-
tion that each state can either increase (+) or decrease (−) budget deficits. These will
either result in a positive or negative budget balance. Figure 2.1 provides an extensive
form version of this game. With two players, player A and player B.
+ +
+
−
−
−
B B
A
(α, α) (γ, γ)(λ, ω) (ω, λ)
Figure 2.1: Extensive Form Game
The payoffs associated with each parameter are as follows:
α ≡ stimulus + spillovers − balance λ ≡ stimulus − spillovers − balance
ω ≡ spillovers + balance γ ≡ balance
If player A enacts an expansion they receive benefits through the form of a stimulus,
but lose utility in the form of a decreased budget balance. If player B also enacts a
stimulus, then player A will receive a higher payoff through spillovers from B. If player B
reduces budget deficits then player A’s payoff will decrease as its stimulus leaks abroad
and it does not receive offsetting spillovers from B. Note that without the presence of
spillovers, the game would not explicitly account for the policies enacted abroad.
This set up slightly deviates from the traditional prisoner’s dilemma. A prisoner’s
dilemma assumes ω > α > γ > λ. But, as noted above, there are large benefits for
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cooperation during economic crises. Thus if we allow α > ω – which, after solving the
inequality for the domestic stimulus, implies that the payoff to the domestic stimulus is
greater than two times the payoff of reducing the budget deficit – there is a Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium with both players increasing budget deficits and both players believing
the probability that the other player increases budget deficits is between zero and one.
This is proven as follows.
Let both players hold prior beliefs that the other player will increase budget deficits
(+) with probability P . Then each player will enact fiscal expansions (+) in equilibrium
if the expected utility of stimulus policies given probability P is greater than the expected
utility of fiscal contractions (−) given probability P . Formally, both players will enact
stimulus policies (+) in equilibrium if
EUi(+|P ) ≥ EUi(−|P ) (2.2)
Where expected utilities are defined as:
EUi(+|P ) = Pα + λ(1− P ) (2.3)
EUi(−|P ) = Pω + γ(1− P ) (2.4)
Plugging 4 and 5 into 2.2 and solving for P yields
P ≥ γ − λ
α− ω + γ − λ (2.5)
Because α > ω by assumption then the numerator in 2.5 is less than the denominator,
which implies that P < 1. As long as γ > λ, which is also true by assumption, then
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P > 0.18 Therefore, there is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium where both players enact fiscal
expansions.
However, P may be so large such that we rarely observe both players spending in
equilibrium. But the equilibrium value of P depends on the values of the parameters
α, ω, γ, λ. First order conditions show the effect of a marginal increase in these parameters
on P .
∂P
∂α
= − γ − λ
(α + γ − λ− ω)2 (2.6)
∂P
∂ω
=
γ − λ
(α + γ − λ− ω)2 (2.7)
∂P
∂λ
= − α− ω
(α + γ − λ− ω)2 (2.8)
∂P
∂γ
=
α− ω
(α + γ − λ− ω)2 (2.9)
The signs on the first order conditions show that P is decreasing in α and λ while P
is increasing in γ and ω. The negative sign on α shows that as the payoff associated with
cooperating increases, each country can assign a lower prior probability that the other
country will enact fiscal expansions and still enact a fiscal expansion in equilibrium. As
the benefits of cooperating rise, or the payoffs associated with stimulus policies increase,
an equilibrium where both countries increase budget deficits becomes more likely. But
as the payoffs associated with expansionary policies fall, a country will need to have a
larger prior belief that the other country will enact a stimulus in order for both to increase
18γ > λ implies that the payoff to the domestic stimulus minus the spillovers abroad is greater than
two times the payoff to an improved budget balance. If an improved budget balance had a higher payoff
than the domestic stimulus minus the spillovers, we would not expect a country to spend in equilibrium.
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budget deficits in equilibrium.
Similarly, the positive signs on γ and ω show that when the payoffs associated with
reducing budget deficits increase, a country will need to assign a higher prior probability
that the other country will pass expansionary policies in order to also enact fiscal expan-
sions in equilibrium. When the payoff to increasing budget deficits falls such that α = ω
the game approaches a traditional prisoner’s dilemma where after solving 2.2 for P ,
P ≥ γ − λ
γ − λ ⇒ P = 1 (2.10)
Because a probability must be between zero and one P here must equal 1. Thus a
state will be indifferent between increasing and decreasing budget deficits in equilibrium
only if its prior belief that the other state will increase budget deficits equals one. If ω > α
the game is a traditional prisoner’s dilemma and there is no Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
such that both countries spend.19
19This also assumes that γ > λ, which implies higher benefits to contractionary policies relative to
expansionary policies.
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2.8 First Stage of 2SLS
In Table 2.3, the distance weighted independent variables are instruments to predict
the trade weighted dependent variables. For example, in model 1 the dependent variable
is the trade weighted average total number of quarters a state’s trade partners spend
in recession. For model 2 the dependent variable is the trade weighted total number of
quarters a state’s trade partners spend in recovery. The first stage of the regression is
estimated:
Ŵi,tRi,t = αi + γDi,tBi,t + ρDi,tSi,t +
n∑
k=1
βkXk,i,t + εi,t (2.11)
Because recession and recovery are estimated in separate models, Ŵi,tRi,t, is an n× 1
vector in each model. The dependent variables in Table 2.3 are the following:
Models Dependent Variable
1, 5 Recession abroad (trade weighted, total quarters)
2, 6 Recovery abroad (trade weighted, total quarters)
3, 7 Recession abroad (trade weighted proportion)
4, 8 Recovery abroad (trade weighted proportion)
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Table 2.3: First Stage of 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Primary Balance 0.002 0.021 −0.001 0.003 0.032∗∗ 0.018 0.005 0.004
(0.014) (0.027) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.022) (0.004) (0.003)
Spatial Primary Balance 0.043 −0.156∗ 0.024∗ −0.045∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ −0.118∗ 0.028∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.088) (0.013) (0.014) (0.029) (0.067) (0.009) (0.010)
Recession Abroad 0.994∗∗∗ 1.128∗∗∗
(Distance Weighted Total Quarters) (0.045) (0.034)
Recovery Abroad 1.131∗∗∗ 1.257∗∗∗
(Distance Weighted Total Quarters) (0.106) (0.092)
Recession Abroad 1.032∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗
(Distance Weighted Proportion) (0.060) (0.043)
Recovery Abroad 0.953∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗
(Distance Weighted Proportion) (0.070) (0.051)
Change Real GDP −0.032∗ 0.037 −0.016∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.017) (0.029) (0.006) (0.005)
Domestic Recession 0.103∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗
(Total Quarters) (0.023) (0.045) (0.009) (0.007)
Domestic Recovery −0.030∗∗ 0.042∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.004
(Total Quarters) (0.013) (0.025) (0.005) (0.004)
Trade Openness −0.001 −0.007 0.001 −0.001
(0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Inflation −0.004 −0.031 0.007 −0.009
(0.022) (0.043) (0.008) (0.007)
M2 −0.001 −0.007 −0.0004 −0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP Per Capita (Log) 0.116 −0.453 0.014 −0.019
(0.266) (0.511) (0.096) (0.080)
Debt to GDP Ratio −0.002 0.013∗∗ −0.002∗∗ 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Interest Rate Spread 0.013 0.023 −0.002 0.009
(0.020) (0.038) (0.007) (0.006)
Partisan Orientation of Exec. −0.028 −0.044 −0.008 −0.005
(0.031) (0.060) (0.011) (0.009)
Years Exec. in Office 0.005 0.045∗∗ 0.0001 0.007∗∗
(0.012) (0.022) (0.004) (0.003)
Years to Next Exec. Election 0.017 0.050 0.011 0.010
(0.022) (0.041) (0.008) (0.007)
Vetoes 0.050 0.100 −0.007 0.006
(0.042) (0.080) (0.015) (0.013)
Legislative Frac. 0.686 0.292 0.180 0.040
(0.460) (0.875) (0.167) (0.140)
Observations 346 346 346 346 448 448 448 448
R2 0.878 0.763 0.801 0.845 0.792 0.696 0.724 0.805
Adjusted R2 0.751 0.652 0.685 0.723 0.723 0.636 0.661 0.734
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
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Robustness Checks
Time Period
Table 2.4 extends the time period in Table 2.1 to 1980-2012. Due to substantial
missing data for the dependent variable the number of observations does not dramatically
increase. Nonetheless all of the results hold except for the reduced form version of the
proportion of countries abroad in a recovery (Model 8). Although the sign is as expected
it is now above the threshold for statistical significance.
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Table 2.4: Results Extending Time Period
Dependent variable:
Primary Balancet+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Primary Balance 0.752∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.045) (0.042) (0.047) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044)
Spatial Primary Balance −0.102 0.088 −0.157∗∗ 0.061 −0.052 0.163∗∗∗ −0.104 0.065
(0.078) (0.097) (0.076) (0.096) (0.062) (0.061) (0.067) (0.064)
Recession Abroad −0.526∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗
(Weighted Total Quarters) (0.120) (0.052)
Recovery Abroad 0.261∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗
(Weighted Total Quarters) (0.082) (0.070)
Recession Abroad −2.907∗∗∗ −2.074∗∗∗
(Weighted Proportion) (0.446) (0.263)
Recovery Abroad 0.815∗∗ 0.421
(Weighted Proportion) (0.368) (0.418)
Change Real GDP −0.069 0.003 −0.113∗∗ 0.031
(0.042) (0.039) (0.048) (0.035)
Domestic Recession 0.043 −0.028 0.078 −0.053
(Total Quarters) (0.096) (0.093) (0.090) (0.091)
Domestic Recovery −0.063∗ −0.052∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.038
(0.032) (0.031) (0.035) (0.030)
Trade Openness 0.0003 −0.004 0.009 −0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Inflation −0.007 0.033 0.003 0.033
(0.040) (0.042) (0.040) (0.044)
M2 0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Eurozone −0.475 −0.449 −0.566 −0.416
(0.380) (0.401) (0.410) (0.403)
GDP Per Capita (Log) −1.456∗∗∗ −1.266∗∗∗ −1.168∗∗ −1.330∗∗∗
(0.497) (0.477) (0.460) (0.493)
Debt to GDP 0.034∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Interest Rate Spread 0.069 0.092 0.050 0.087
(0.060) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064)
Partisan Orientation of Exec. −0.043 −0.031 −0.057 −0.025
(0.092) (0.095) (0.086) (0.098)
Years Exec. in Office 0.055 0.072 0.052 0.073
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
Years to Next Exec. Election 0.028 0.054 0.030 0.058
(0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.052)
Vetoes 0.091 0.097 0.052 0.101
(0.101) (0.097) (0.110) (0.097)
Legislative Frac. 1.101 0.182 1.431 −0.066
(0.996) (1.000) (1.042) (1.020)
Observations 465 465 465 465 666 666 666 666
R2 0.682 0.671 0.684 0.668 0.608 0.600 0.604 0.595
Adjusted R2 0.607 0.597 0.609 0.595 0.572 0.565 0.568 0.560
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
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Fixed Effects and Lagged Dependent Variable
Scholars in other disciplines often point out that including fixed effects and a lagged
dependent variable in a single model violates the strict exogeneity assumption and should,
therefore, be avoided (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, pgs. 243-247). But models that in-
clude both fixed effects and lagged dependent variables are common in political science
and especially international relations. Table 2.1 follows this norm. To account for this
problem, I use the spatial lagged dependent variable to instrument for the lagged de-
pendent variable, thus removing the lagged dependent variable from the model. Table
2.5 replicates Table 2.1 but uses the spatial primary balance as an instrument for the
primary balance at time t. All of the main results from Table 2.1 hold in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5: Results Correcting for FE and LDV (2000 - 2012)
Dependent variable:
Primary Balancet+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Primary Balance 0.231∗ 1.468∗∗∗ 0.239∗ 2.085∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 1.130∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 1.560∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.206) (0.129) (0.361) (0.059) (0.119) (0.055) (0.222)
Recession Abroad −0.533∗∗∗ −0.351∗∗∗
(Weighted Total Quarters) (0.191) (0.055)
Recovery Abroad 0.771∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗
(Weighted Total Quarters) (0.152) (0.085)
Recession Abroad −2.232∗∗∗ −1.554∗∗∗
(Weighted Proportion) (0.562) (0.204)
Recovery Abroad 5.556∗∗∗ 3.728∗∗∗
(Weighted Proportion) (1.346) (0.746)
Change Real GDP 0.007 −0.234∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.207
(0.060) (0.087) (0.056) (0.127)
Domestic Recession 0.261 0.020 0.264∗ −0.134
(Total Quarters) (0.160) (0.130) (0.153) (0.204)
Domestic Recovery −0.102∗∗ 0.041 −0.116∗∗ 0.111
(Total Quarters) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.086)
Trade Openness 0.028 −0.006 0.033∗∗ −0.019
(0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023)
Inflation −0.060 0.155 −0.015 0.344∗
(0.075) (0.113) (0.082) (0.187)
M2 −0.004 −0.019∗ −0.005 −0.028
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.019)
GDP Per Capita (Log) −1.427 2.837∗∗ −1.339 5.833∗∗
(1.243) (1.188) (1.192) (2.255)
Debt to GDP Ratio 0.013 0.063∗∗∗ 0.011 0.108∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.024)
Interest Rate Spread 0.216∗∗ 0.166∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.132
(0.087) (0.092) (0.086) (0.132)
Partisan Orientation of Exec. −0.126 0.220 −0.124 0.398
(0.185) (0.144) (0.182) (0.261)
Years Exec. in Office 0.078 0.099 0.076 0.122
(0.058) (0.068) (0.057) (0.102)
Years to Next Exec. Election 0.073 0.102 0.087 0.141
(0.060) (0.076) (0.055) (0.117)
Vetoes 0.352 −0.157 0.314 −0.355
(0.230) (0.140) (0.227) (0.298)
Legislative Frac. 1.988 −2.501 1.811 −5.702
(2.179) (2.291) (2.089) (3.473)
Observations 344 344 344 344 415 415 415 415
R2 0.558 0.594 0.581 0.536 0.568 0.566 0.588 0.535
Adjusted R2 0.479 0.510 0.498 0.460 0.516 0.514 0.534 0.486
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2.6 extends the previous table, which corrects for the inclusion of fixed effects
and a lagged dependent variable, to 1980. The main results are statistically indistin-
guishable from Table 2.4. However, the level of p-value for the weighted proportion of a
state’s trade partners in recovery (Model 8) now equals .1, just above the threshold for
marginal statistical significance.
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Table 2.6: Results Correcting for FE and LDV (1980 - 2012)
Dependent variable:
Primary Balancet+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Primary Balance 0.525∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.054) (0.106) (0.054) (0.057) (0.059) (0.066) (0.044)
Recession Abroad −0.669∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗
(Weighted Total Quarters) (0.148) (0.063)
Recovery Abroad 0.292∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(Weighted Total Quarters) (0.072) (0.070)
Recession Abroad −3.707∗∗∗ −2.314∗∗∗
(Weighted Proportion) (0.590) (0.307)
Recovery Abroad 1.204∗∗∗ 0.614
(Weighted Proportion) (0.373) (0.373)
Change Real GDP −0.055 −0.029 −0.091∗ 0.007
(0.042) (0.045) (0.048) (0.043)
Domestic Recession 0.107 −0.053 0.172 −0.079
(0.115) (0.082) (0.120) (0.081)
Domestic Recovery −0.108∗∗∗ −0.026 −0.167∗∗∗ −0.015
(0.040) (0.031) (0.053) (0.032)
Trade Openness 0.008 −0.009 0.021∗ −0.009
(0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009)
Inflation −0.026 0.047 −0.022 0.055
(0.037) (0.046) (0.040) (0.050)
M2 0.005 −0.004 0.005 −0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Eurozone −0.202 −0.699∗∗ −0.151 −0.674∗∗
(0.552) (0.309) (0.728) (0.321)
GDP Per Capita (Log) −2.391∗∗∗ −0.447 −2.567∗∗∗ −0.440
(0.623) (0.544) (0.675) (0.548)
Debt to GDP 0.023∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.013 0.048∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
Interest Rate Spread 0.091 0.073 0.081 0.071
(0.061) (0.063) (0.067) (0.065)
Partisan Orientation of Exec. −0.123 0.030 −0.184 0.036
(0.116) (0.078) (0.127) (0.081)
Years Exec. in Office 0.057 0.067 0.057 0.070
(0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.047)
Years to Next Exec. Election 0.025 0.051 0.029 0.058
(0.045) (0.052) (0.048) (0.055)
Vetoes 0.127 0.066 0.098 0.073
(0.120) (0.089) (0.146) (0.091)
Legislative Frac 1.734 −0.143 2.379∗∗ −0.522
(1.084) (1.108) (1.202) (1.123)
Observations 465 465 465 465 666 666 666 666
R2 0.657 0.664 0.599 0.660 0.599 0.596 0.578 0.593
Adjusted R2 0.586 0.593 0.535 0.589 0.565 0.562 0.545 0.559
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
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Missing Data
The results in all of the above analyses used listwise deletion to account for missing
data. As a further robustness check for the results provided in Table 2.1, Table 2.7 uses
multiple imputation to account for missing data over the time period 2000-2012. I used
20 imputations using the Amelia R package (Honaker et al., 2011). This increased the
number of observations from 344 in models one through four and 415 in models five
through eight to 476 (an increase of 132 and 61 observations, respectively). All of the
main results hold.
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Table 2.7: Results with Multiple Imputation
Dependent variable:
Primary Balancet+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Primary Balance 0.625∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.074) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058)
Spatial Primary Balance −0.095 0.374∗∗ −0.071 0.362∗∗ −0.133 0.283∗∗ −0.122 0.279
(0.157) (0.176) (0.160) (0.177) (0.111) (0.143) (0.112) (0.173)
Recession Abroad −0.508∗∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗
(Weighted Total Quarters) (0.127) (0.066)
Recovery Abroad 0.542∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗
(Weighted Total Quarters) (0.139) (0.117)
Recession Abroad −2.067∗∗∗ −1.459∗∗∗
(Weighted Proportion) (0.442) (0.260)
Recovery Abroad 2.46∗∗∗ 1.779∗∗
(Weighted Proportion) (0.761) (0.759)
Change Real GDP −0.09 −0.043 −0.093 0.031
(0.060) (0.054) (0.060) (0.054)
Domestic Recession 0.071 0.061 0.072 0.008
(Total Quarters) (0.103) (0.104) (0.100) (0.112)
Domestic Recovery −0.036 −0.051 −0.049 −0.035
(Total Quarters) (0.042) (0.039) (0.042) (0.038)
Trade Openness 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Inflation −0.034 0.022 −0.037 0.036
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.080)
M2 −0.008 −0.009 −0.01 −0.01
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
GDP Per Capita (Logged) −0.553 −0.494 −0.465 0.062
(0.930) (0.962) (0.926) (0.964)
Debt to GDP Ratio 0.027∗ 0.027∗ 0.025∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Interest Rate Spread 0.087 0.124 0.057 0.127
(0.095) (0.091) (0.097) (0.092)
Partisan Orientation of Exec. −0.023 −0.042 −0.032 −0.031
(0.124) (0.116) (0.122) (0.124)
Years Exec. in Office 0.069 0.07 0.07 0.082∗
(0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
Years to Next Exec. Election 0.089 0.104 0.103 0.116
(0.067) (0.064) (0.065) (0.066)
Vetoes 0.153 0.038 0.114 0.059
(0.130) (0.127) (0.128) (0.116)
Legislative Frac. 0.297 −0.55 0.285 −1.136
(1.672) (1.719) (1.642) (1.747)
Observations 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476
R2 0.588 0.579 0.598 0.59 0.526 0.527 0.538 0.532
Adjusted R2 0.515 0.507 0.524 0.516 0.478 0.479 0.489 0.484
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
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Chapter 3
When is Austerity Electorally
Expansionary?
3.1 Introduction
If the state of the economy largely drives voter choice, then we would expect policy-
makers to be punished electorally for austerity, which typically reduces economic growth,
at least in the short term (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Bartels, 2014; Hibbs, 2000). But
incumbents have enacted austerity in response to recessions and then gone on to win
reelection (Arias and Stasavage, 2016; Walter, 2016). This contradiction between theory
and observation has led scholars to question the utility of the economic voting model
(Achen and Bartels, 2016; Arias and Stasavage, 2016; Frank, 2007). This theoretical
shortcoming, however, may be a result of a failure to sufficiently account for the inter-
national dimensions of fiscal policy. After incorporating these factors, this chapter finds
that the economic voting model provides a strong explanation for both the varying fiscal
policy responses to recessions and the electoral effects of these policies.
This chapter argues that a country’s rate of economic growth relative to its main
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export markets largely shapes fiscal policy choices. If a state’s major export markets are
experiencing high rates of growth relative to the domestic economy, incumbents may push
for austerity – or at least smaller fiscal expansions – and allow growth abroad to boost the
domestic economy through increased exports. Increased exports may allow incumbents
to oversee the end of a recession while keeping budget deficits to a minimum. But if
a country’s export markets are performing poorly relative to the domestic economy, an
export-led recovery is likely to prove unfeasible. With weak demand abroad incumbents
are likely to enact larger fiscal expansions and to tolerate higher budget deficits.
I test this argument with two different empirical analyses of 34 OECD countries.1
To test the argument that the fiscal policy response to recessions is conditional on the
performance of a country’s export markets relative to the domestic economy, I analyze
recessions across the OECD from 1980 to 2012. To test the electoral impact of these
conditional fiscal policy responses, I analyze elections in OECD countries in the aftermath
of the 2008 global financial crisis. Taken together, the argument and empirical results
suggest that international factors play an important yet under-appreciated role in our
understanding of both budgetary policies and economic voting. The findings show that
austerity may, in fact, be help incumbents at the polls when a state’s export markets are
performing well relative to the domestic economy.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Part two reviews the literature on
the relationship between fiscal policy and electoral outcomes. Part three argues that
electorally-oriented incumbents are likely to set fiscal policies conditional on the rate of
economic growth abroad. Part four tests the observable implications of this chapter’s
argument. Part five concludes.
1A full list of these countries is included in Appendix A.
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3.2 Fiscal Policy and Electoral Outcomes
Fiscal policy, along with monetary policy, is the most potent tool policymakers have
to influence the economy (Akerlof et al., 2014). The ability to shape economic output has
led to much research analyzing how policymakers may use these policies for their elec-
toral benefit (Hibbs, 1977).2 Theories of political business cycles and economic voting
generally assume policymakers will be prone to enact expansionary fiscal and monetary
policies, which may lead to long-term macroeconomic problems. This has led to efforts
to “tie incumbents’ hands” by devolving monetary policy to independent central banks
and to balanced budget amendments in countries’ constitutions (Bisin et al., 2015; Broz,
2002). But empirically fiscal policy is hardly uniformly expansionary, even in response
to recessions when theory would predict expansionary policies to become more likely.
Furthermore, in some cases, policymakers have responded to recessions with contrac-
tionary measures and then been rewarded at the polls with reelection. Thus it remains
unclear why election-oriented policymakers would respond to economic recessions with
fiscal policies ranging from tight contractions to loose expansions.
Existing explanations for how election-oriented policymakers use fiscal policy may
be organized in two camps. The first, based on retrospective voting, sees the state of
the economy as a key driver of vote choice (Fiorina, 1981; Hibbs, 2000; Key, 1966).3
The other camp sees ideological factors, which may flow from policymakers to voters, as
driving voters’ decisions (Blyth, 2013; Downs, 1957; Kriner and Reeves, 2012). Here, fiscal
policy may depend more on what actors view as the “appropriate” policy response. Both
of these approaches offer distinct explanations for why election-oriented policymakers
would adopt various fiscal policies in response to recessions.
2See Alesina et al. (1997) for a critique of political business cycle models.
3Because retrospective voting generally argues the state of the economy drives voter behavior, I use
the terms retrospective voting and economic voting interchangeably.
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Theories of retrospective voting argue that voters largely decide whether or not to
reelect incumbents, or incumbents’ parties, based on their governing performance (Fior-
ina, 1981; Key, 1966). Voters may measure governing performance through broad metrics
such as economic growth and war, among other factors (Barreiro, 2008; Bartels, 2014; Hi-
bbs, 2000). Although earlier models of economic voting assumed voters would rationally
evaluate an incumbent’s performance, most contemporary models drop this assumption
(Achen and Bartels, 2016; Healy and Malhotra, 2013). Before casting their votes, voters
tend to emphasize the absolute rate of economic growth rather than that relative to the
neighboring countries (Bartels, 2014). If voters do account for economic performance
abroad, they are likely to be susceptible to framing effects by the media (Kayser and
Peress, 2012). Furthermore, experimental and observational evidence shows that citi-
zens overemphasize more recent economic performance relative to economic performance
earlier in an incumbent’s term (Huber et al., 2012; Krause and Melusky, 2014). Taken to-
gether, retrospective voting suggests that policymakers simply need to promote economic
growth in the election year in order to significantly increase their likelihood of reelection.
This leads us to expect that policymakers would generally respond to recessions with
stimulus policies in order to boost economic growth.
However, these theories of retrospective voting struggle to explain why incumbents
with capabilities to spend countercyclically may respond to recessions with austerity –
policies that, by definition, reduce economic output. To explain this, researchers have
argued that beliefs and partisan ideology drives vote choice to a greater extent than
retrospective voting suggests (Boix, 1998; Downs, 1957). Socially constructed notions of
how the world works, or how the world ought to work, can drive both voter decisions
and the decisions of elite policymakers (Chwieroth, 2010a). Election-oriented incumbents
may respond to recessions with austerity because they believe austerity is the appropriate
response (Blyth, 2013). Voters may follow cues from political elites and then also come to
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support these policies (Achen and Bartels, 2016). This does not necessarily suggest that
incumbents do not care about the well being of their voters, but that they have a differ-
ent ideological framework for determining which policies may actually lead to economic
growth. Ideas that austerity could, in fact, be expansionary (Alesina and Ardagna, 2009)
may have led incumbents to adopt these policies despite opposing viewpoints that these
policies would only worsen a recession.4
Seemingly in acknowledgement that the economic voting model is inadequate, a third
perspective argues that incumbents seek to minimize economic costs to those that vote
for them (Bearce, 2003; Garrett, 1998; Walter, 2013, 2016). In other words, incumbents
seek to promote the economic well-being of those who share their ideology. Assuming
incumbents know that austerity is likely to increase unemployment, Walter (2013, 2016)
argues that incumbents adjust to balance of payments crises in ways that minimize the
economic costs for those most likely to vote for them. Because right governments are
more likely to favor low budget deficits (Boix, 1998), right governments that face weak
opposition may be more likely to enact austerity policies. Supporters of left governments,
such as labor, are then more likely to bear the brunt of these adjustment costs, which may
be realized through spending cuts rather than tax increases (Walter, 2016). Therefore,
literature in this tradition argues that incumbents are likely to act in ways that protect
those that share their ideological viewpoints.
However, partisan ideology did little to predict fiscal stimulus measures in response
to the 2008 financial crisis (Bartels, 2014). For example, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, who long publicly opposed purported benefits of deficit spending, oversaw one of
the largest fiscal stimulus policies in Europe (Blyth, 2013; Prasad and Sorkin, 2009). As
ideology struggles to explain why political parties on the right may enact fiscal stimulus
4These policies also bode well for those who wanted to place blame on the state for economic woes
(Blyth, 2013).
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policies and then win reelection, retrospective voting struggles to explain why incumbents
would win reelection after enacting austerity in response to recessions. Therefore, the
existing literature offers incomplete explanations for why electorally-minded policymakers
enact varying fiscal policies in response to recessions.
Voters certainly take issues other than the state of the economy and budget deficits
into account when casting their ballots. Politicians may also respond to interest groups
that seek policies that are in their narrow interests, but can cause further harm to the
domestic economy (Olson, 1982). Economic constraints such as the amount of interest
paid on government debt (Armingeon, 2012) and institutional constraints such as the
eurozone also shape fiscal policy choices (Stiglitz, 2016). But the next section argues
that integrating international economic factors into theories of economic voting provides
a clear explanation for varying fiscal policy responses to recessions.
3.3 International Effects of Fiscal Policy
This section begins with the assumption, supported by several empirical studies, that
incumbents face an electoral trade-off between reducing budget deficits and increasing
economic growth. This assumption is well founded in the empirical literature, which
shows that the economic growth in the year preceding an election is among the best pre-
dictors of reelection (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Barreiro, 2008; Bartels, 2014; Chwieroth
and Walter, 2014) and that incumbents tend to be punished for large debt buildups
(Alesina et al., 1998; Brender and Drazen, 2008; Peltzman, 1992). Therefore, in line with
these empirical findings, I assume that incumbents are electorally-oriented and seek to
increase economic output while minimizing budget deficits.
With an accommodating monetary policy, fiscal policy may promote an economic
recovery from a recession. The Mundell-Fleming model argues that fiscal expansions
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generally increase interest rates, which puts pressure on the exchange rate to appreciate.
All else equal, higher interest rates reduce investment in the domestic economy while
an appreciated currency reduces exports and increases imports. However, monetary
authorities may accommodate a fiscal expansion by keeping interest rates low. This
halts the currency from appreciating and allows fiscal policy to effectively increase output.
Indeed, with a fixed exchange rate, monetary authorities are forced to intervene with a
monetary expansion to keep the exchange rate fixed. Therefore, fiscal expansion with an
accommodating monetary policy may be expected to to promote an economic recovery.
Although fiscal expansions may lead to a recovery, these policies must eventually be
financed. Funding these policies may potentially result in higher taxes and potentially
higher interest rates if earlier policies promoted inflation. This may lead voters to oppose
expansionary policies. Presumably, this opposition is a key driver of the empirical finding
that budget deficits are negatively associated with an incumbent’s reelection prospects.
Therefore, policymakers are likely to look for ways to promote a domestic economic
recovery while minimizing budget deficits. They may do this by looking abroad.
If foreign economies are performing well, incumbents may push for contractionary
policies and hope that exports will pick up slack in the domestic economy. Fiscal con-
tractions can increase the competitiveness of a state’s exports by reducing prices, wages
and interest rates. Lower prices, wages, and interest rates generally reduce the real ex-
change rate, thus making relative prices fall even if the nominal exchange rate is fixed
(Frieden, 1991, 2014). Lower prices may then boost a country’s exports, resulting in an
economic recovery.
In an analysis of fiscal consolidations that led to economic recoveries in Denmark,
Ireland, Finland, and Sweden in the 1980s and 1990s, Perotti (2012) finds that the
recoveries were largely export driven. Another study by IMF researchers of Europe’s
peripheral countries and the Baltic states following the 2008 financial crisis found that
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wages fell faster in the tradable sector than in the non-tradable sector in every country
except Greece (Kang and Shambaugh, 2014). Increased export competitiveness thus
explains the largely export-led recovery in the Baltics. Indeed, analyses of cases in
which fiscal consolidations have led to quick recoveries point out that these recoveries are
generally export driven (Blyth, 2013; Perotti, 2012).5 Therefore, contractionary policies
may foster an export-led recovery, which can allow incumbents to oversee an improved
economy by the election year while minimizing fiscal deficits.
But an export-led recovery is likely unfeasible if demand abroad is weak. If the do-
mestic economy is in recession and export markets are in even deeper recessions, austerity
could end up actually worsening the domestic recession. Fiscal contractions may not only
hurt voters by increasing unemployment in the short-term, but, even if the real exchange
rate depreciates, a subsequent increase in exports and economic recovery is unlikely to
follow due to weak demand abroad. Therefore, if a state is in a recession and its major
trade partners are performing even worse, incumbents are likely to tolerate higher budget
deficits in an effort to boost economic recovery through fiscal expansion.
To summarize, this chapter argues that if a state is in a recession, election-oriented
incumbents will be motivated to seek to promote a recovery while keeping budget deficits
to a minimum. Hence, before enacting fiscal policy, incumbents may be expected to
consider how the domestic economy is performing relative to its major export markets.
If these export markets are performing well relative to the domestic economy, austerity
policies at home may allow incumbents to oversee an economic recovery through increased
exports while minimizing budget deficits.6 But if the domestic economy is performing
well relative to its export markets, an export-led recovery is unlikely to work due to weak
5This is in contrast with arguments such as Alesina and Ardagna (2009), which argue that austerity
can lead to recoveries by increasing consumer and investor confidence.
6Although wages and prices tend to be sticky downward (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009), the above studies
of “successful austerity” suggest that prices and wages may adjust quicker in countries where exports
can foster an economic recovery.
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demand abroad. In this case, we may expect policymakers to push for expansionary
policies and tolerate higher budget deficits. Formally, this may be stated as a first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 During recessions, lower (higher) levels of economic growth relative
to a state’s export markets are associated with more contractionary (expansionary) fiscal
policies.
Consideration of the electoral ramifications of these fiscal policies, in turn, leads to a
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Contractionary (expansionary) fiscal policies conditional on low (high)
rates of economic growth relative to a state’s export markets are associated with more
votes in the subsequent election.
3.4 Data and Methods
Hypothesis 1 states that fiscal policy depends, at least in part, on how a country’s
real gross domestic product (GDP) grows relative to that of its export markets. I define
the difference between the change in domestic GDP and the change in GDP abroad as a
state’s relative economic performance (REP). Because this study analyzes countries that
are in recession, policymakers, are most likely concerned with changes in output rather
than relative levels, which follows from the economic voting literature. As such, GDPi
is defined as the annual percent change in real GDP in state i. GDPEi is defined as the
export weighted average of the annual percent change in real GDP of state i’s major trade
partners. I use export weighted GDP because exports are the key mechanism through
which GDP in state i would grow after increased foreign demand for domestic goods.
Data on trade flows come from the IMF’s direction of trade statistics. Formally, relative
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economic performance may be expressed as:
REPit = GDPit −GDPEit (3.1)
Positive values occur when state i is experiencing higher growth than its export
markets and is, therefore, performing well relative to its export markets. Negative values
occur when state i is growing at a slower rate than than its export markets and is,
therefore, performing relatively worse.
This measure for relative economic performance also accounts for the varying depths
of recessions across countries. If a country is in a deep recession it will most likely have
a lower value for relative economic performance than a country that is in a relatively
milder recession because the country will have a larger percentage decrease in real GDP.
This variable also implicitly captures the possible endogeneity between domestic and
international economic performance. For example, if the domestic economy is doing
poorly while its trade partners are doing well, there will likely be a larger negative number
for relative economic performance. But if the whole world is in a recession, then a state’s
economic performance relative to its trade partners may be closer to zero. Because this
variable does not perfectly capture this endogeneity, I also include a variable for the fiscal
policies enacted in a state’s export markets to control for these spatial effects as well as
other several control variables, discussed in more detail below.
This measure also depends on conditions abroad, such as fiscal policies. Because data
for fiscal policies, as defined below, are unavailable for a number of countries, I limit the
analysis to OECD countries. Although restricting the case selection to only the OECD
excludes exports to several emerging markets, most of the world’s largest economies, and
hence the world’s largest importers, are members of the OECD. Including all possible
export markets in the measure for relative economic performance may be desirable, but
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the lack of data makes it difficult to control for other external factors that may be
influencing both REP and fiscal policy, thus casting doubt on exogeneity assumptions.
A potential problem of with using the trade weighted proportion of a state’s trade
partners’ economic performance is reverse causality. Fiscal policies may be used as a tool
to influence trade flows between countries. To account for this problem I use an instru-
mental variables approach with the minimum distance between two countries, measured
in kilometers, as an instrument for trade between countries. Countries that are geo-
graphically close trade more with each other than those that are geographically distant
(Feyrer, 2009). Thus geography causes countries to trade more, but it is highly unlikely
that trade or fiscal policy causes countries to be geographically close. In other words I use
REPD, where growth abroad is weighted by distance between countries, to instrument
for REPE, where growth abroad is weighted by exports. Data for the minimum distance
between countries come from Weidmann et al. (2010). Formally, I estimate the following
two equations:
REPEi,t = αi + γ1REP
D
i,t +
n∑
k=2
γkXk,i,t + νi,t (3.2)
Budgeti,t+1 = αi + β1R̂EPEi,t ×Recessioni,1 +
n∑
j=2
βjZj,i,t + εi,t (3.3)
Where αi represents time-invariant unit-specific effects. For example, Sweden and
Chile have budget balanced amendments in their constitutions that may constrain their
ability to respond to recessions. Fixed effects account for these factors. X and Z represent
vectors of control variables. The lower-order terms of the interaction are included in these
control variables. ν and ε represent error terms. Output for the first stage regression is
available in Appendix C.
62
When is Austerity Electorally Expansionary? Chapter 3
3.4.1 Dependent Variable
To measure fiscal policies one cannot simply analyze changes in the budget balance
because recessions tend to deepen budget deficits even if states enact contractionary fiscal
policies. This may lead one to infer the exact opposite of the policies actually enacted.
To measure fiscal policy I use the general government structural balance as a percentage
of GDP, which adjusts for business cycle fluctuations. This variable is denoted Budget
Balance in the output tables below. Fiscal expansions are associated with lower values
and fiscal contractions are associated with higher values of this variable. I lead this
variable one period because changes in taxes or spending will largely be realized in the
following year’s budget balance. For example, in the United States the fiscal year begins
in October. Factors that affect budget decisions will occur before October, but these
factors’ impact on the budget will not be observed until the following year.
As a robustness check, available in Supplementary File 1, I use expenditures instead of
the cyclically adjusted budget balance to measure fiscal policy. The results are generally
robust to this alternative measure. But, as Prasad and Sorkin (2009) point out, several
stimulus policies passed in 2008 relied to a large extent on tax cuts. Tax cuts made
up about 35% of total stimulus in the United States and Spain and 68% of the 2008
stimulus in Germany (Prasad and Sorkin, 2009).7 Because expenditures do not capture
policies such as tax cuts, government expenditures is an inferior measure of budget policy
compared to cyclically adjusted budget balances. A recent study by IMF researchers that
surveyed the literature on fiscal consolidation shows that the cyclically adjusted budget
balance is among the most common measures for fiscal policy (Escolano et al., 2014).8
7Germany’s 2009 stimulus included more spending.
8Only a small minority of the papers surveyed in Escolano et al. (2014) distinguish between taxes
and spending in their measures of fiscal consolidation.
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3.4.2 Independent and Control Variables
Recessions can have various causes, such as banking crises, currency crises, or those
caused by natural disasters. But a strict focus on GDP to define a recession is commonly
used in the economics literature (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014). Although focusing on
GDP alone may ignore other important aspects of the economy, Okun’s law shows there
is a strong negative correlation between economic growth and unemployment. Therefore,
focusing on economic growth as measured by GDP, although imperfect, captures several
other aspects of an economy that are correlated with other macroeconomic conditions
that likely affect vote choice, such as unemployment.
I use the popular definition of a recession as two consecutive quarters of negative
GDP growth. This definition is given in popular macroeconomics textbooks, such as
Blanchard (2011) and is popular in most journalistic sources. To ensure that the data
more accurately capture the underlying trend in each state’s economy and not seasonal
fluctuations, I use seasonally adjusted quarterly data. These data come from the OECD.
A recession is defined as lasting until real GDP stops declining. Countries take the value
of one in each year if at least one quarter in the year was preceded by a quarter of negative
GDP growth.
To calculate relative economic performance, REP, I take the difference between the
growth of real GDP in state i minus the export weighted average GDP in state i’s
export markets. The IMF direction of trade statistics provide data for countries’ export
markets. Unlike studies such as Cao (2012), there is no need to distinguish among the
type of exports being sent from country i to each country j because this chapter is
interested in analyzing how the economic performance of a state’s main export markets
affects domestic fiscal policy choices. By using real GDP, which is adjusted for the price
level, the relative economic performance variable implicitly accounts for changes in the
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price levels of consumer goods both at home and abroad.
Fiscal policies abroad can affect a state’s relative economic performance because ex-
pansionary or contractionary policies in a state’s export market will affect the trade
weighted change in real GDP. To control for the effects of spatial interdependence, or the
effects that the fiscal policies enacted in a state’s export markets have on domestic fiscal
policies, I include a spatially lagged dependent variable (Chaudoin et al., 2015; Franzese
and Hays, 2007). This is denoted below as Spatial Budget. Italics denote how the variable
is identified in the output tables.
The economic voting literature argues that annual changes in Real GDP affect the
probability of an incumbent winning reelection. Similarly, we may expect countries that
experience larger declines in GDP to enact larger fiscal expansions to try to recover from
the decline. To control for this effect I include a variable for the a country’s change in
real GDP.
The effect of the performance of a state’s export markets on fiscal policy is likely
shaped, to some extent, by how dependent a country is on trade. More closed economies
are less likely to respond to conditions in their export markets. More open economies
may be more prone to respond to internationally-oriented pressure groups (Frieden, 2014;
Olson, 1965). Because more closed economies may be less likely to consider the state of
foreign economies in making their economic policy decisions, I include a control variable
for Trade Openness, which is defined as the sum of a country’s exports and imports
divided by GDP (Rodrik, 1998).
Countries have varying economic constraints on their ability to run budget deficits.
Because fiscal policy is the main tool used to stabilize the accumulation of debt, I include
a variable for the gross Debt to GDP Ratio of each country in the sample. The debt to
GDP ratio may also affect voters’ aversion toward budget deficits. But because some
countries can run higher amounts of debt than others, I also include a variable for long
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term Interest Rate Spreads to further account for the ability of states to run budget
deficits. The spreads are calculated with the US interest rate as a base. This follows
from a previous study that showed that interest rate spreads were the best predictor of
austerity in Europe following the 2008 financial crisis (Armingeon, 2012). Furthermore,
countries with large balance of payments deficits may be forced to either enact austerity
or devalue the exchange rate (Walter, 2016). To control for this factor I include a variable
for the Current Account Balance as a percentage of GDP. Data for these variables come
from the IMF World Economic Outlook.
Several OECD countries are in the Eurozone. Eurozone countries have signed pacts
limiting budget deficits, which may constrain their fiscal policies. To capture these effects,
I include a dummy variable for each year a country is in the eurozone.
I also include variables of political institutions that are likely to affect fiscal policy
decisions. All of these data come from an updated version of Beck et al. (2001). The
timing of a subsequent election may affect fiscal policy decisions (Kayser, 2005; Schleiter
and Tavits, 2016). Politicians with longer time horizons may favor policies that let prices
and wages, or the exchange rate, adjust downward thus fostering export-led recoveries.
Politicians with a shorter time horizon may favor expansionary policies for their short-
term benefits. In line with the political business cycles literature (Hibbs, 1977), the
number of years a leader has in office before an election may be negatively associated
with budget balances. To control for the possible effect of timing, I include a variable for
the number of years remaining until the executive’s subsequent election, Years to Next
Exec. Election, as well as a variable for how many years an incumbent has been in office,
Years Exec. in Office, following Kayser (2005).
The number of veto players is negatively associated with the ability of governments
to pass legislation (Tsebelis, 1995). Therefore, I include a variable for the number of
Vetoes. However, veto players may not matter if the legislative majority is cohesive. To
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control for this, I include a variable to account for the fraction of legislative seats that are
held by the governing party. Larger values of this variable, denoted as Legislative Frac.,
indicate that the governing party controls are larger portion of the legislature, thus it
can more easily pass policies.
As the literature review showed, a government’s partisan orientation may also affect
its fiscal policy response to a recession. Therefore, I include dummy variables for the
Partisan Orientation of Exec. indicating if the executive is on the political center, right,
or undefined. Left parties are the base.
To control for a time trend I include a cubic polynomial, although I do not present
the results for each time variable. Summary statistics of all of the variables used in the
regression are presented in Appendix B.
3.4.3 Empirical Technique and Results
In both stages, I use country level fixed effects to control for unit-specific heterogene-
ity. An F-test confirms that a fixed effects model fits the data significantly better than
a pooled OLS model. A statistically significant Hausman test suggests a random effects
model is inefficient, thus supporting estimation of a fixed effects model. A Breusch-Pagan
test shows that there is heteroskedasticity in the data. Therefore, in the second stage
of the regression, after correcting the standard errors to account for the instrumental
variable, I use cluster robust standard errors. Table 3.1 presents the results.9 Models 1
through 4 interact relative economic performance with a dummy variable that is coded
one for each year a country is in recession. As a robustness check, Models 5 through 8
subset the data to only include recession years.
Recall that higher values of the dependent variable indicate more contractionary poli-
cies while lower values indicate more expansionary policies. Because the effects of inter-
9The design of the tables throughout this chapter are modified from Hlavac (2015).
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Table 3.1: Fiscal Policy as a Function of Relative Economic Performance
Dependent variable:
Budget Balancet+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spatial Budget Balance 0.413∗∗ 0.332∗ 0.324∗ 0.273 0.378 0.378 0.154 0.177
(0.195) (0.190) (0.190) (0.203) (0.319) (0.312) (0.378) (0.444)
REP × Recession −0.533∗∗∗ −0.449∗∗∗ −0.492∗∗∗ −0.496∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.133) (0.138) (0.129)
REP −0.099 −0.179∗ −0.192∗ −0.175∗ −0.616∗∗∗ −0.505∗∗∗ −0.550∗∗∗ −0.601∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.104) (0.102) (0.093) (0.151) (0.148) (0.132) (0.158)
Recession −0.659 −0.424 −0.213 0.047
(0.448) (0.432) (0.498) (0.394)
Change Real GDP 0.303∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.229∗∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.356∗∗
(0.068) (0.071) (0.064) (0.051) (0.105) (0.101) (0.099) (0.145)
GDP Per Capita (Log) −3.275∗∗∗ −4.356∗∗∗ −5.215∗∗∗ −2.872 −2.106 −3.622
(1.039) (1.297) (1.339) (1.799) (2.187) (2.770)
Eurozone −1.469 −1.599∗ −1.407 −1.122
(0.944) (0.947) (2.262) (2.011)
Debt to GDP −0.011 −0.014 0.024 0.028
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020)
Interest Rate Spread 0.079 0.051 0.360∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗
(0.090) (0.096) (0.127) (0.140)
Center Exec. −0.738 −0.612 2.098 2.689
(0.756) (0.833) (1.718) (2.091)
Right Exec. 0.109 0.119 0.032 0.384
(0.389) (0.321) (1.086) (1.040)
Undefined Exec. 0.411 0.505 −2.057 −1.226
(1.096) (1.057) (1.786) (1.797)
Years Exec. in Office 0.082 0.179
(0.051) (0.125)
Years to Next Exec. Election 0.018 −0.135
(0.061) (0.202)
Vetoes 0.105 0.554∗∗
(0.074) (0.264)
Legislative Frac. 0.872 3.869
(1.875) (5.597)
Trade Openness 0.011 −0.026
(0.019) (0.030)
Current Account Balance −0.098 −0.124
(0.061) (0.106)
Observations 605 605 547 533 126 126 115 113
R2 0.177 0.225 0.273 0.314 0.195 0.237 0.359 0.422
Adjusted R2 0.166 0.211 0.252 0.286 0.141 0.169 0.231 0.250
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
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action terms are more clearly visible graphically, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 plots the marginal
effects of each interacted variable along with 95 percent confidence intervals. Figure 3.3,
also includes a frequency distribution for observations along the x-axis, as recommended
by Berry et al. (2012). Figure 3.2 plots the marginal effects of the relative economic
performance variable on the budget balance over all observed values of the recession vari-
able. Figure 3.3 plots the marginal effects of a recession on the cyclically adjusted budget
balance over the full range of relative economic performance that is observed. Figures
3.2 and 3.3 use the results from model 1.
Figure 3.1: Marginal Effects of REP and Recession on the Cyclically Adjusted Budget
Balance
−
0.
8
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
0.
0
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f  
 
R
el
at
ive
 E
co
no
m
ic
 P
e
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
No Recession Recession
l
l
Figure 3.2: Marginal Effects of REP
Figure 3.2 shows that when the recession variable is held at zero, the marginal effect
of relative economic performance is statistically indistinguishable from zero. But during
recessions, the marginal effect of relative economic performance is negative and statisti-
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Figure 3.3: Marginal Effects of Recession
cally significant. Conditional on a recession, the effect of a one-unit increase in relative
economic performance is associated with about a 0.6 percentage point decrease in the
cyclically adjusted budget balance. This negative effect suggests that when a country
is in a recession, fiscal policies become more expansionary as its relative economic per-
formance increases. This is the relationship we would expect if a country used fiscal
policy to try to boost the economy with a secondary concern on limiting budget deficits.
This negative relationship also supports the converse: countries that have lower levels
of relative economic performance are associated with higher cyclically adjusted budget
balances. This suggests that countries that are performing poorly relative to their export
markets are more likely to adopt austerity measures.
Figure 3.3 plots the budgetary effects of a recession over all observed values of relative
economic performance. Figure 3.3 provides strong support for this chapter’s argument.
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When relative economic performance is less than about negative three, recessions are
estimated to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the adjusted budget
balance. This suggests that nations with low relative economic performance are likely to
enact austerity after a recession. As shown above, these policies may be enacted with
the goal of promoting an export-led recovery. Figure 3.3 also shows that when relative
economic performance becomes positive – or when a state is performing better than the
export weighted average of its export markets – recessions are estimated to be negative
and statistically significant. Again, this supports the hypothesis that when countries are
performing well relative to their export markets an export-led recovery is likely to prove
unfeasible, making these countries more likely to enacted a fiscal stimulus.
The histogram in Figure 3.3 shows that relative economic performance is normally
distributed. Over several observations the marginal effect is negative and statistically
significant while over other observations the marginal effect is positive and statistically
significant. It is a relatively small area – where REP is around zero – where the marginal
effects are not statistically significant. This is consistent with this chapter’s argument
that fiscal expansion – or contraction – is shaped by a country’s economic performance
relative to its export markets. We would expect relative economic performance to have
stronger effects on fiscal policy when the absolute value is large and to have a weaker effect
on fiscal policy when the value is small. Overall, these results provide strong support for
this chapter’s argument. The results suggest that election-oriented incumbents may set
fiscal policy in a way to maximize output and minimize budget deficits.
As a comparison with other measures, model 8 shows that a one-standard deviation
increase in REP is associated with a 1.62 percentage point decrease in the adjusted
budget balance. A one standard deviation increase in Interest Rate Spreads is associated
with a 1.45 percentage point increase in the adjusted budget balance. Although interest
rates are generally observed to be among the best predictors of fiscal policy (Armingeon,
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2012), this result suggests that the effect of REP is around the same size. These results
are, therefore, also substantively significant. Note that the partisan orientation of the
executive has no statistically significant effect on fiscal policy. Independent of economic
factors and partisan ideology, relative economic performance appears to be an important
driver of fiscal policy during recessions.
3.4.4 Electoral Effects of Fiscal Policy
Although the above models provide support for the argument that relative economic
performance is associated with the fiscal policy response to recessions, the models say
little about the electoral effect of these policies. This section seeks to uncover the electoral
effects of various fiscal policies conditional on a state’s relative economic performance.
I use the same data as above, but subset to elections from 2009 to 2011, following
Bartels (2014). The analysis covers 16 unique election across OECD countries.10 A list
of these elections is available in Appendix D. This time period marks a point where most
OECD countries experienced recessions. Because I am interested in estimating the effects
of fiscal policy conditional on various levels of relative economic performance, this subset
removes any need to run a triple interaction, which is not only difficult to interpret but
also adds more variables to the regression (Achen, 2005). This short time period also
reduces time-confounding factors.
Formally, I estimate the following equation:
∆V otei,t = α + β1∆REP
E
i,t−2 ×∆Budgeti,t−2 +
n∑
j=2
βj∆Xj,i,t−1 + εi,t (3.4)
The dependent variable is the change in the incumbent party’s vote share from the
10In addition to removing cases in line with Bartels (2014), Hungary’s 2010 election is also removed
from the sample due to missing budget balance data.
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previous election. To measure the effect of budget balances conditional on relative eco-
nomic performance, I interact REP and Budget. The constituent terms of the interaction
are included in the control variables. Budget is operationalized, again, as the government
structural balance as a percentage of potential GDP. As a robustness check I also use
expenditures, which is available in Supplementary File 1, and continue to find general
support for the argument.
Following research on economic voting, this chapter assumes that policymakers seek
to oversee economic growth by the election year. Because of temporal lags that occur
before fiscal policy affects the economy, I lag both the REP and Budget variables two
years. This gives fiscal policy anywhere from just over one year to just under two years
to affect the economy by the election. As elections may be held early or late in the year
– elections occur between February and November for countries in this sample – I use a
different technique to adjust for the month in which each election was held. The results,
available in Supplementary File 1, are statistically identical. I use first differences with
the independent variables to account for time invariant unit-specific effects.11 Table 3.2
presents the results.
Hypothesis 2 states that conditional on low (high) relative economic performance,
contractionary (expansionary) policies will have a positive electoral effect – recall that
higher (lower) values for budget balances indicate contractionary (expansionary) policies.
The negative and statistically significant estimates of the interaction term appear to
support this hypothesis. But because both variables used in the interaction term are
continuous, interpretation of the results in Table 3.2 is difficult. As with the previous
results, figures 3.4 and 3.5 provide marginal effects plots with 95 percent confidence
intervals, where Figure 3.4 shows the marginal effects of Budget over all observed values
of REP and Figure 3.5 shows the marginal effects of REP over all observed values of
11All data are in the form of a panel with T = 2.
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Table 3.2: Electoral Effects of Budget Conditional on REP
Dependent variable:
Change in Incumbent Party Vote Share
(9) (10) (11)
REP × Budget −0.723∗∗ −0.891∗∗∗ −0.938∗∗
(0.293) (0.245) (0.343)
REP −1.265 −2.504∗∗∗ −2.646∗∗∗
(0.797) (0.679) (0.779)
Budget −2.024∗ −1.352 −1.406
(1.117) (0.855) (0.950)
Change Real GDP −0.739∗∗∗ −0.734∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.171)
Interest Rates −0.268
(1.030)
Constant −8.074∗∗∗ −9.619∗∗∗ −9.891∗∗∗
(1.781) (1.659) (1.652)
Observations 16 16 16
R2 0.269 0.484 0.487
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.333 0.305
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
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Budget. Both of these figures use the results from model 9. The estimated effect sizes for
model 9 are the smallest in Table 3.2, thus the figure below uses the most conservative
estimates.
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Figure 3.4: Marginal Effects of Budget
Although the small sample size requires some caution when interpreting the results,
figures 3.4 and 3.5 provides support for the argument that the effect of fiscal policy on an
incumbent party’s vote share is conditional on a state’s relative economic performance.
Figure 3.4 shows that at low observed values of REP, increased budget balances – more
contractionary policies – are positively associated with more votes for the incumbent
party in the next election. The estimate is statistically and substantively significant. At
low levels of REP, a 1 percentage point increase in the budget balance is associated with
just under a 2 percentage point increase in the incumbent party’s vote share.
If a country is performing well relative to its export markets – when REP is positive
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Figure 3.5: Marginal Effects of REP
– the effect of fiscal policy is negative and of statistically significant. This suggests that
when an economy is performing well relative to its export markets, stimulus policies may
boost vote share for the incumbent party. These estimated effects are, again, substan-
tively strong. The estimate suggests that a 1 percentage point decrease in the budget
balance is associated with an increase in the incumbent’s vote share by up to 4 percentage
points. This is consistent with arguments that fiscal stimulus can help incumbents at
the polls. Although this is only significant for a relatively few observations, keep in mind
that the sample size is small.
This effect of fiscal policy on an incumbent party’s vote share is unlikely to be driven
by ideological factors because the effect is conditional on levels of REP. For example,
if neoliberal ideologies were driving the results, we would expect a positive relationship
between austerity and vote share for the incumbent across all levels of REP, however,
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this is not what the data show.
While these results do not provide smoking gun evidence in support of Hypothesis 2
– and should be taken with caution due to the small sample size – the results coupled
with those in Table 3.1 provide strong support for this chapter’s theoretical argument. In
cases where an economy is performing poorly relative to its export markets, policymakers
systematically enact contractionary fiscal policies. Consistent with the economic voting
literature, these policies may be optimal for election-oriented incumbents by allowing
them to oversee an export-led recovery while minimizing budget deficits. An analysis
of elections during and following the global financial crisis shows that when a country
is performing poorly (well) relative to its main export markets, austerity (stimulus)
may be electorally expansionary. Taken together, these results suggest that incumbents
strategically use fiscal policy in order to boost their reelection prospects.
3.5 Conclusion
A logical extension of the economic voting literature suggest that incumbents in states
with the ability to run budget deficits should generally enact fiscal stimulus policies in
response to recessions. But empirically we see much variation in the policy responses to
recessions. Furthermore, incumbents have won reelection despite enacting harsh austerity
measures, which seems to contradict the predictions of much of the economic voting
literature. This chapter seeks to resolve these apparent contradictions by accounting
for international factors. I show that a state’s economic performance relative to its
trade partners is a key driver of fiscal policy. Conditional on a state’s relative economic
performance, fiscal policy also has consistent electoral effects. The results suggest that
austerity policies appear to be electorally expansionary when a state is performing poorly
relative to its export markets.
77
When is Austerity Electorally Expansionary? Chapter 3
After considering the international economic effects of fiscal policy, these results
should not be too surprising. Economic studies have found that austerity is only likely
to promote growth if strong exports follow these policies (Blyth, 2013; Perotti, 2012).
If the economic voting model is correct, we would expect austerity to be electorally ex-
pansionary under these conditions. However, by treating the international economy as
a constant, research designs are unable to capture the electoral effects of various fiscal
policies. Political economy research has much to gain by further considering international
factors (Cohen, Forthcoming ; Oatley, 2011).
The results from this study are likely applicable to the monetary and exchange rate
realm. If policymakers seek to boost economic growth through monetary or exchange
rate policy, they may consider whether policies designed to increase exports can plausibly
achieve this goal given the state of the global economy. If a country’s export markets
are performing poorly, policies that foster exchange rate depreciation are unlikely to sub-
stantially boost exports due to weak demand abroad. Therefore, monetary and exchange
rate policies may also be conditioned by international economic factors.
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3.6 Summary Statistics of Variables in Regression
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics for Variables in Table 3.1
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Adjusted Budget Balance −2.589 3.469 −18.61 5.968
Spatial Budget Balance −2.2 1.325 −8.656 1.358
REPE 0.373 2.69 −14.6 10.34
REPD (Instrument) −0.256 2.889 −14.795 11.304
Recession 0.183 0.387 0 1
Change Real GDP 2.662 3.111 −14.738 12.266
Trade Openness 77.303 46.111 15.924 346.372
Interest Rate Spread −2.260 4.543 −41.793 7.296
Eurozone 0.178 0.383 0 1
Current Account Balance 0.218 8.036 −60.271 30.337
GDP Per Capita (Log) 9.652 0.925 7.022 11.627
Debt to GDP Ratio 56.164 34.929 0.000 243.203
Vetoes 4.001 1.490 1 16
Partisan Orientation of Exec. 1.845 1.007 0 3
Years to Next Exec. Election 1.766 1.321 0 7
Years Exec. in Office 4.207 3.873 1 33
Legislative Frac. 0.574 0.129 0.121 1.000
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for Variables in Table 3.2
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
∆ Incumbent Vote % −6.404 5.379 −12.590 0.740
∆ REP −1.837 2.458 −4.669 1.266
∆ Budget 0.123 3.625 −2.614 6.149
∆ Change Real GDP 4.198 9.448 −3.750 17.215
∆ Interest Rate 0.019 2.845 −2.660 4.113
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3.7 First Stage of 2SLS
Below is the first stage regression for the results Table 3.1. Because of the interaction
term in models 1 through 4, I present the first stage for models 1 through 8, which subset
to cases that are in recession.
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Table 3.5
Dependent variable:
REPE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spatial Budget Balance 0.097 0.087 0.197∗ 0.224∗
(0.089) (0.086) (0.114) (0.122)
REPD 0.914∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 1.057∗∗∗ 1.049∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.072) (0.072)
Change Real GDP −0.047 −0.058 −0.118∗∗ −0.087
(0.052) (0.050) (0.053) (0.056)
GDP Per Capita (Log) −1.371∗∗∗ −2.710∗∗∗ −2.359∗∗∗
(0.493) (0.687) (0.768)
Eurozone −1.815∗∗∗ −1.543∗∗
(0.605) (0.641)
Debt to GDP −0.008 −0.002
(0.008) (0.008)
Interest Rate Spread 0.068 0.035
(0.053) (0.052)
Center Exec. 0.513 0.310
(0.423) (0.452)
Right Exec. 0.315 0.332
(0.218) (0.230)
Undefined Exec. −0.157 −0.136
(0.612) (0.685)
Years Exec. in Office 0.031
(0.037)
Years to Next Exec. Election −0.120∗
(0.069)
Vetoes −0.098
(0.142)
Legislative Frac. −1.156
(2.212)
Trade Openness −0.022∗∗
(0.010)
Current Account Balance −0.020
(0.034)
Observations 130 130 115 113
R2 0.894 0.902 0.924 0.936
Adjusted R2 0.653 0.652 0.595 0.555
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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3.8 OECD Elections 2009-2011
Country Year Month Vote Gain
Germany 2009 Sept. -12.59
Greece 2009 Oct. -8.36
Iceland 2009 April -12.94
Israel 2009 Feb. -4.68
Japan 2009 Aug. -9.09
Norway 2009 Sept. 2.68
Portugal 2009 Sept. -8.47
Australia 2010 Aug. -2.58
Hungary 2010 May -23.91
Netherlands 2010 June -14.46
Slovak Republic 2010 June 5.66
Sweden 2010 Sept. 3.83
United Kingdom 2010 May -6.19
United States 2010 Nov. -8.37
Estonia 2011 March 0.74
Finland 2011 April -9.23
Ireland 2011 Feb. -24.11
Robustness Checks
This section uses expenditures in lieu of the cyclically adjusted budget balance as a
measure of fiscal policy. As stated above, the cyclically adjusted budget balance controls
for economic fluctuations that may also affect the budget but are independent of fiscal
policy. For this reason, very few studies use expenditures as a measure of fiscal policy and
instead use cyclically adjusted budget balance data. A recent study by IMF researchers
that surveyed the literature on fiscal consolidation shows that the cyclically adjusted
primary balance is among the most common measures for fiscal policy (Escolano et al.,
2014).
The empirical analysis in the chapter used three sets of data: (1) data from 1980 to
2012, (2) data from 1980 to 2012 subset to only include recession years and (3) election
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data from 2009 to 2011. Analyses of the first two datasets use fixed effects, while analysis
of the third uses first differences. Table 3.6 compares the two measures over all three
datasets, regressing expenditures on cyclically adjusted budget balances and regressions
cyclically adjusted budget balances on expenditures. I use fixed effects in models (1, 2,
4, and 5) and first differences on models (3 and 6). All else equal, higher expenditures
should be associated with lower budget balances.
Table 3.6: Relationship between Expenditures and the Cyclically Adjusted Budget Bal-
ance
Dependent variable:
Expenditures Adjusted Budget Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Budget Balance −0.817∗∗∗ −0.369∗∗∗ 0.206
(0.046) (0.127) (0.318)
Expenditures −0.393∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗ 0.141
(0.022) (0.074) (0.218)
Constant 1.370∗ −0.222
(0.655) (0.619)
Observations 696 128 16 696 128 16
R2 0.321 0.079 0.029 0.321 0.079 0.029
Adjusted R2 0.307 0.061 0.025 0.307 0.061 0.025
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.6 shows that over the longer time period (models 1, 2, 4, and 5) there is a
very strong relationship between expenditures and the cyclically adjusted budget balance.
However, over the short time period (models 3 and 6), the relationship between the two
variables is weak. Expenditures likely increased over the time period 2008 to 2012 in
ways related to the business cycle and, therefore, do not accurately capture fiscal policy
responses over the time period. Because the literature treats cyclically adjusted budget
balance as generally a superior measure to expenditures to capture fiscal policy, less
weight should be given to analyses that use expenditures, especially in the robustness
check on Hypothesis 2.
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3.8.1 Expenditures as Dependent Variable: Hypothesis 1
Table 3.7 is the same as Table 3.1 but uses expenditures as the dependent variable.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that higher (lower) REP is associated with higher (lower) ex-
penditures. The first four models largely support this hypothesis, as the interaction effect
is positive and statistically significant. The second four models, however, are less support-
ive as the estimate for REP on the subset of recessions is statistically indistinguishable
from zero although the sign is in the hypothesized direction.
The following figures plot the marginal effects. Figure 3.6 plots the marginal effects
of REP over recessions and non-recessions while Figure 3.7 plots the effects of a recession
over all observed values of REP.
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Figure 3.6: Marginal Effects of REP
As with Figure 3.2 when the recession variable is held at zero, the marginal effect for
REP is statistically insignificant. However, when during recessions REP is positive and
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Table 3.7: Expenditures as a Function of Relative Economic Performance
Dependent variable:
Budget Balancet+1
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Spatial Expenditures 0.045 0.048 −0.016 −0.034 0.038 0.071 0.052 −0.031
(0.090) (0.091) (0.064) (0.056) (0.129) (0.136) (0.130) (0.129)
REP × Recession 0.439∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.145) (0.140) (0.130)
REP −0.148 −0.133 −0.082 −0.041 0.275 0.178 0.124 0.283
(0.145) (0.143) (0.107) (0.108) (0.174) (0.169) (0.126) (0.177)
Recession 1.118∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗ 0.949∗∗ 0.407
(0.426) (0.458) (0.384) (0.334)
Change Real GDP −0.487∗∗∗ −0.495∗∗∗ −0.419∗∗∗ −0.525∗∗∗ −0.446∗∗ −0.410∗∗ −0.334∗ −0.580∗∗
(0.116) (0.119) (0.111) (0.114) (0.193) (0.195) (0.191) (0.261)
GDP Per Capita (Log) 0.905 3.403∗∗∗ 5.513∗∗∗ 2.030 7.334∗∗∗ 11.471∗∗∗
(0.981) (1.179) (1.223) (1.546) (2.438) (2.898)
Eurozone −0.126 −0.409 2.790 2.362
(1.069) (1.030) (3.262) (2.686)
Debt to GDP 0.090∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.069∗ 0.078∗∗
(0.022) (0.019) (0.035) (0.031)
Interest Rate Spread −0.278∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.447∗∗∗ −0.470∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.082) (0.139) (0.151)
Center Exec. 1.444∗∗∗ 0.847 1.247 −0.688
(0.542) (0.645) (1.724) (0.968)
Right Exec. 0.265 0.199 0.196 −0.111
(0.393) (0.403) (0.771) (0.616)
Undefined Exec. −1.525 −1.430 −0.682 −2.768
(1.146) (0.960) (1.843) (1.792)
Years Exec. in Office −0.080 −0.421∗∗
(0.049) (0.207)
Years to Next Exec. Election −0.089 −0.081
(0.065) (0.173)
Vetoes −0.433∗∗ −0.860∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.304)
Legislative Frac. −4.040 −13.391
(3.603) (14.096)
Trade Openness 0.019 0.037
(0.019) (0.026)
Current Account Balance 0.185∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗
(0.047) (0.114)
Observations 568 568 511 497 118 118 107 105
R2 0.265 0.305 0.428 0.484 0.175 0.197 0.269 0.411
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.285 0.393 0.438 0.124 0.139 0.169 0.235
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 3.7: Marginal Effects of Recession
statistically significant at the .05 level (p = 0.047). In other words during recessions,
countries with higher REP are more likely to increase expenditures. Figure 3.7 shows
that at low levels of REP recessions are associated with negative expenditures, suggesting
that at low REP austerity is more likely. But at higher values of REP recessions have a
positive marginal effect on expenditures, suggesting that countries with higher rates of
economic growth relative to their export markets are more likely to enact fiscal stimulus.
Overall, these results are not as robust as when the cyclically adjusted budget balance
is used as a dependent variable, but expenditures is also an inferior measure of fiscal
policy. Nonetheless, these results are broadly consistent with what Hypothesis 1 predicts,
especially when REP is interacted with recessions.
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3.8.2 Expenditures as Dependent Variable: Hypothesis 2
Table 3.8 estimates the effects of expenditures, conditional on various levels of REP,
on the incumbent party vote share.
Table 3.8: Electoral Effects of Expenditures Conditional on REP
Dependent variable:
Change in Incumbent Party Vote Share
(9) (10) (11)
REP × Expenditures 0.163 0.173 −0.037
(0.311) (0.427) (0.375)
REP −3.978∗∗ −4.004∗∗ −3.031
(1.491) (1.725) (1.723)
Expenditures −2.125∗∗ −2.143∗ −2.599∗∗
(0.822) (1.010) (0.916)
Change Real GDP 0.014 −0.135
(0.419) (0.352)
Interest Rates 1.397
(0.825)
Constant −5.480∗∗∗ −5.420∗ −4.356∗
(1.726) (2.566) (2.256)
Observations 16 16 16
R2 0.397 0.397 0.490
Adjusted R2 0.298 0.273 0.307
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
Hypothesis 2 predicts that conditional on high (low) levels of REP, expenditures will
have a positive (negative) impact on vote share. Although Table 3.8 does not provide
statistically significant estimates. Although this does not provide support for the hy-
pothesis, Figure 3.8 and 3.9 provides marginal effects plots with 95 percent confidence
intervals.12
12Because I difference the variables, the x-axis represents changes in REP and Budget, respectively,
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Figure 3.8 shows that at low values of REP, expenditure cuts are related to an increase
in vote share – the marginal effect of a one unit increase in expenditures is associated
with a decrease in vote shares, which implies that cuts are associated with an increase
in vote shares. However, the figure does not show a statistically significant relationship
for expenditure increases at high values of REP. But, as stated above, expenditures is
a weaker indicator of fiscal policy than the cyclically adjusted budget balance. For this
reason, most studies in economic use adjusted budget balances to analyze the effects of
fiscal policy (Escolano et al., 2014).
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Figure 3.8: Marginal Effects of Expenditures
as recommended by (Berry et al., 2012).
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Figure 3.9: Marginal Effects of REP
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3.8.3 Adjusting For Election Month
The analysis above allows fiscal policy anywhere between one and two years to affect
the economy by the time of the election. This heterogeneity is caused by elections being
held at different times throughout the year in different countries.This may create bias
because each additional unit of stimulus may have much more time to operate in some
cases than in others. I account for this heterogeneity by adjusting for the month the
election was held. The median election year in the sample is June. If an election is held
after June, I use changes in fiscal policy, conditional on REP, during the previous year,
t−1. If an election is held during or before June, I use changes in fiscal policy, conditional
on REP, with a two year lag, t− 2. This gives fiscal policy roughly 18 months to affect
voting behavior and reduces unobserved factors related to the election’s timing. Table
3.9 presents the results.
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Table 3.9: Electoral Effects of Budget Conditional on REP
Dependent variable:
Change in Incumbent Party Vote Share
(1) (2) (3)
REP × Budget −0.658∗∗ −0.933∗∗∗ −0.897∗∗∗
(0.297) (0.250) (0.283)
REP −1.333 −2.577∗∗∗ −2.497∗∗∗
(0.906) (0.741) (0.747)
Budget −1.592 −1.221 −1.245
(1.223) (0.882) (0.894)
Change Real GDP −0.774∗∗∗ −0.779∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.190)
Interest Rate Spread 0.260
(0.989)
Constant −8.865∗∗∗ −10.365∗∗∗ −10.143∗∗∗
(2.538) (2.106) (2.160)
Observations 27 27 27
R2 0.129 0.164 0.179
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.134 0.139
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
91
When is Austerity Electorally Expansionary? Chapter 3
3.9 Supplementary Evidence: The Case of Estonia
Estonia pursued an austerity-led recovery strategy in response to the 2008 financial
crisis. In 2008, Estonia was hit especially hard by the global financial crisis. According
to the OECD, its real GDP fell by 5.3 percent in 2008. Real GDP fell a further 14.7
percent in 2009. The electoral prospects of then Prime Minister Andrus Ansip’s Reform
Party looked bleak. But rather than responding to the recession with a fiscal stimulus,
as may be expected given electoral incentives in a country facing a severe downturn,
Estonia enacted a large austerity package, which totaled roughly nine percent of GDP
(European Commission, 2010). The theory developed in this chapter would predict that
the Estonian government chose austerity policies, in part, in an effort to boost exports to
markets whose economies were performing relatively better. Sweden and Finland were
Estonia’s top two export destinations for each year from 2008 to 2010. Table 3.10 shows
the change in real GDP in Estonia, Finland, and Sweden from 2008 to 2010.
Table 3.10: Change in Real GDP in Estonia, Finland, and Sweden, 2008–2011
Year Estonia Finland Sweden
2008 −5.3 0.7 −0.6
2009 −14.7 −8.3 −5.2
2010 2.5 3 6
Table 3.10 shows that Estonia’s largest two export markets experienced milder reces-
sions than Estonia.13 In other words, Estonia had a low rates of economic growth relative
to its top two export markets. Although these export markets were by no means per-
forming well, Estonia still enacted contractionary policies, which may have been designed
to boost exports. An IMF report notes that prices and wages in Estonia’s tradable sector
did indeed fall after contractionary fiscal policies were enacted (Kang and Shambaugh,
13Russia, which became Estonia’s largest export market in 2015, also went through the 2008 global
financial crisis relatively unscathed.
92
When is Austerity Electorally Expansionary? Chapter 3
2014). To highlight the effects these policies had on its exports, Figure 3.10 plots total
exports from Estonia to Finland and Sweden from 2007 to 2011.
Figure 3.10: Total Exports from Estonia to Finland and Sweden, 2007–2011
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Figure 3.10 shows that after initially falling, Estonian exports rapidly increased to
both Finland and Sweden. By 2010, exports to Sweden had recovered their precrisis lev-
els; by 2011 exports to both countries surpassed their precrisis levels. Therefore, Estonia
saw a boost in exports to these countries, even though they also saw economic downturns
during 2008 and 2009. This is not to suggest that austerity policies in Estonia played a
mono-causal role in its export-led recovery, but given that the policies were followed by
a decrease in prices and wages in the tradable sector, they likely played a significant role
in the quick rebound of exports. Recall from Table 2 that Estonia’s real GDP turned
positive in 2010. Even though much of the intellectual support for austerity was based
on the role of expectations and confidence (Alesina and Ardagna, 2009), economic theory
also suggests these policies would serve to boost exports. Indeed, popular presses such
as The Economist (2011) credited Estonia’s recovery to the boost in exports to Finland
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and Sweden and focused much less on the role of confidence.14 Despite the largely dis-
credited argument that austerity can be expansionary by boosting confidence, we have
theoretical and empirical evidence that suggests under certain conditions austerity can
foster a recovery by making exports more competitive.
After the global financial crisis, the 2011 Estonian election looked dim for the incum-
bent majority party. But the party actually increased its majority, gaining two additional
seats in parliament. Both the intricacies of the 2011 election and the decision to enact
austerity are clearly multifaceted. For example, the partisan orientation of the govern-
ment along with desires to join the eurozone, which it joined in 2011, likely also played a
role in the fiscal policy decisions (Raudla and Kattel, 2011), as did the fact that Estonia
faced balance of payments problems (Walter, 2016). But to the extent that the state of
the economy drives voter behavior, Estonia’s export-led recovery effort likely played a
significant role in the incumbent party winning reelection. Absent this boost in exports,
the government would have undoubtedly faced much more electoral difficulty.
This study does not seek to defend the potential virtues of austerity. It simply asks
why politicians, with electoral incentives to enact policies that lead to economic recovery
vary with respect to their fiscal policy decisions. This is not to suggest that politicians
uniformly enact the electorally optimal policy and therefore win reelection – as stated
throughout, and supported by the results in Table 3.2, politicians’ reelection prospects
following a recession are bleak. But the empirical results along with evidence from the
case of Estonia suggests that politicians may push for contractionary fiscal policies under
certain conditions – specifically, when their country’s rate of economic performance is low
relative to its export markets – and these policies may increase their electoral prospects.
Estonia faced these conditions, enacted austerity policies, and the incumbent government
14Scholars have noted that despite GDP numbers rebounding, there were high social costs of austerity
policies in Estonia. Unemployment, for example, remained stubbornly high through 2011 (Blyth, 2013).
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won reelection.
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Chapter 4
The International Foundations of
Interest Group Influence
4.1 Introduction
International political economy research has long argued that the policy preferences
of industries, interest groups, firms, and voters strongly influence economic policy choices
(Frieden, 1991, 2014; Steinberg, 2015). But preferences are meaningless if actors lack the
capabilities, or influence, to turn these preferences into policy. This chapter asks what
allows those in certain industries to gain the ability to influence policy relative to those
in other industries. I argue that influence, over a broad range of policies, stems from
at least two major sources: revenue and employees. Increases in revenue may be used
to provide campaign contributions and fund other lobbying efforts (Osgood et al., ming;
Rogowski, 1989). Employers may also motivate their employees to mobilize for policies
favorable to the firm (Babenko et al., 2016; Bearce and Tuxhorn, ming; Jensen et al.,
2016).
Literature often posits that broad domestic economic (Gourevitch, 1986; Rogowski,
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1989) or institutional shocks (Milner and Kubota, 2005) lead to policy change. But
shocks seem neither necessary nor sufficient for policy change. For instance, assuming
the largest financial meltdown in nearly 80 years constitutes a shock, one set of studies
found few major shifts in policy preferences or coalitions as a result of the 2008 global
financial crisis (Kahler and Lake, 2013). Furthermore, we often observe policies and
attitudes shift absent any broad shocks. An annual Pew Global Attitudes survey, for
example, found that in 2002, 78 percent of Americans agreed with the statement that
“Growing trade and business ties with other countries is a good thing.” By 2007 – before
the financial crisis began – that number had dropped to 59 percent (Pew Research Center,
2014). Therefore, despite a rich literature on policy preferences, we know relatively little
about the dynamic processes that allow certain actors to see their preferences turned into
policy. These processes are central to our understanding of policy change.
This chapter seeks to further our understanding of these processes. I argue that inter-
national factors – namely, the performance of economies abroad – are key determinants
of policy influence. Increased demand abroad may increase revenues for firms in export-
intensive industries. Actors in these industries may then use these revenues to both
increase lobbying efforts and to hire more employees from firms in industries that are less
likely to export. Through the lobbying and employment channel, I argue that economic
growth abroad is likely to increase the political influence of firms in export-intensive in-
dustries. By linking interest group influence at home with economic conditions abroad,
this chapter provides a clearer picture of economic policy choices. This international el-
ement is commonly lacking in IPE scholarship, where much research remains focused on
domestic-level interests and institutions to explain policy outcomes (Cohen, ming; Oat-
ley, 2011). This chapter shows that international factors strongly shape firms’ lobbying
capabilities as well as overall employment trends and are thus likely to be central drivers
of policy choices.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Part two discusses the role that firm
revenue and employment can play in shaping political influence. I then argue that eco-
nomic shocks are neither necessary nor sufficient to lead to policy change. Part four then
argues that foreign economic conditions play an important role in shifting the relative
distribution of potential political influence within a country, which can lead to policy
change. Part five tests this study’s main hypotheses with cross national panel data and
an analysis of lobbying efforts in the United States. Finally, I discuss this chapter’s
implications.
4.2 Influence: Revenue and Employees
In democracies, a firm’s ability to influence politicians largely comes from two sources:
money and voting age employees.1 Although many scholars have argued that the causal
link between campaign contributions and policy outputs or political access is inconclusive
(Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Baumgartner et al., 2009), recent research has found that
economic elites and organized business groups most likely have a larger impact on policy
than other groups, such as voters at large or smaller businesses (Gilens and Page, 2014;
Page et al., 2013). In the United States, campaign contributions are generally argued to
provide access to policymakers (Kalla and Broockman, 2015; Page et al., 2013). Other
research has found that the source of these donations shape policy outputs (Barber,
2016). These findings are in line with studies of European countries, which also find
that business interests tend to have more influence on policy than non-business interests
(Mahoney, 2007; McMenamin, 2012). Therefore, recent literature confirms our intuition
that those who donate millions of dollars to political campaigns do, in fact, receive some
return on their investment.
1In what follows I equate power with influence, similar to a recent study by Baldwin (2016), and use
the terms interchangeably.
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But wealthy interest groups may have heterogeneous policy preferences. For example,
if financiers and manufacturers have conflicting policy preferences, which group is more
likely to see more preferable policies implemented? Several studies suggest that the
amount of money generated by the financial services industry give it a disproportionately
large amount of political influence (Hacker and Pierson, 2011; Strange, 1998). One recent
study, for example, found that when countries remove capital controls, the financial sector
becomes better positioned to gain more favorable policies (Tomashevskiy, 2015). This
occurs largely because when capital flows into an economy, financiers have more funds
that they can use to pressure politicians. If the financial sector performs well relative to
manufacturers, either because of revenue gains in the financial sector or revenue declines
in manufacturing, this research suggests that policymakers may become more inclined to
enact policies favorable to financiers. Therefore, much literature shows that those who
gain monetary resources relative to others are better positioned, and more likely, to see
favorable policies enacted.
Insights from behavioral economics argue that actors will push harder when in the
realm of losses rather than in the realm of gains. In other words, those that are losing
influence relative to others may be more likely to intensify their lobbying efforts. If
manufacturers lose revenues relative to financiers, for example, prospect theory argues
that manufacturers would intensify their lobbying efforts in order to win more favorable
policies to help recoup previous losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Mercer, 2005). But
relative growth in an industry may allow actors in the growing industry to bear more
costs than competing interest groups (Schlozman et al., 2012). Although psychological
factors undoubtedly play an important role, it seems safe to assume that actors that gain
revenues relative to others will be able to match any additional lobbying efforts enacted
by those with competing interests.
A firm or industry that is gaining economic strength, or revenues, relative to another is
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also likely to increase employment relative to those with competing interests. Generally,
an increase in demand for a firm’s goods will lead the firm to increase employment of
both labor and capital; the possibility that a firm responds to an increase in demand
by solely increasing the intensity of capital investments is discussed below. And there is
reason to believe that employees will mobilize on behalf of their firms.
This intuition is inherent in the Ricardo-Viner model, which is often used to de-
scribe actors’ preferences (Broz and Werfel, 2014; Frieden, 1991, 2014; Steinberg, 2015).
This model suggests that labor and capital within a specific industry will share similar
economic policy preferences. Industries that export are likely to push for trade liberal-
ization, while import-competing industries may lobby for protection. This model is often
contrasted with the Hecksher-Ohlin model, which argues that labor and capital will have
divergent policy preferences. Hiscox (2001, 2002) argues that the level of labor mobility
between industries determines which model more accurately describes reality. When la-
bor can freely move between industries, coalitions are more likely to be class based; when
labor is less mobile, coalitions are more likely to be industry based. It is often assumed
that over the long term labor is free to move between industries, but labor is less mobile
over relatively short time horizons. The Ricardo-Viner model, which is generally used
to describe preferences over relatively short time horizons, supports the expectation that
employees are likely to lobby on behalf of their firms because both labor and capital
within a specific industry may share policy preferences.
Survey evidence largely supports the argument that employees hold policy preferences
in-line with their firms’ material interests (Bearce and Tuxhorn, ming). Additionally,
employees in firms that are performing well, such as export-oriented firms that benefit
from globalization, tend to support incumbents at a higher rate than workers in firms
that are losing market share due to globalization (Jensen et al., 2016; Margalit, 2011).
This suggests that incumbents have strong electoral incentives to push for policies that
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allow firms to perform well. Although several of these studies are at the firm level, and
the Ricardo-Viner model is at the industrial-level of analysis, both strands of research
provide evidence that employees and their employers share overlapping preferences toward
international economic policy.
Firms may seek to reinforce the idea to their employees that they share material
preferences. In a survey of firms in the United States, Hertel-Fernandez (ming) finds that
nearly half of the firms surveyed acknowledged distributing politically-based material to
their employees. This material seems to be effective. About a quarter of the employees
surveyed responded that the political information provided by their employer changed
their opinion on at least one issue. This supports an earlier study that showed that
job supervisors were generally successful in convincing employees to become politically
involved (Schlozman et al., 2012, Pg. 471). Other research has shown that employees
tend to follow the political viewpoints of their CEOs, even after the political ideology of
their CEO exogenously changes from an unexpected turnover, such as a death (Babenko
et al., 2016). Therefore, much research suggests that employees are likely to mobilize
politically, or vote, for policies favorable to their employers.
Although laws have been put in place to limit the amount of political influence man-
agement may exercise over their employees, firms have long found loopholes to get around
these laws (Hertel-Fernandez, ming). The ability of firms to pressure employees to par-
ticipate in politics has increased in the United States since the Citizens United ruling
removed restrictions on such practices (Harvard Law Review, 2014). Even though the-
ory and survey evidence suggests employees and their employers have overlapping policy
preferences, evidence of management seeking to persuade their employees toward par-
ticular political viewpoints suggests that firms often seek to ensure that their employees
mobilize to push for policies favorable to their firms.
Employers may also indirectly shape the likelihood that their employees mobilize
101
The International Foundations of Interest Group Influence Chapter 4
or vote on their firms’ behalf. Much evidence suggests that the state of the economy,
largely through its effect on employment, is among the strongest predictors of voter
behavior (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Bartels, 2014; Hibbs, 2000). Workers that have
recently lost their jobs are more likely to vote against the incumbent party (Margalit,
2011). Firms may use the fact that employment is an important driver of vote choice
to influence policies. For example, employers may threaten to move jobs abroad, which
would result in higher local unemployment rates and thus harm incumbents’ reelection
prospects (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996). Therefore, if firms maintain or increase levels
of employment, its employees are more likely to support incumbents; laid off workers are
more likely to vote against incumbents. Thus even if employers cannot directly mobilize
their employees to vote in their interest, they can indirectly pressure politicians through
threats of layoffs.
4.2.1 What Shifts Revenue and Employment Trends?
Conventional wisdom holds that crises are harbingers of change (Chwieroth, 2010b;
Gourevitch, 1986; Kahler and Lake, 2013; Olson, 1982; Rogowski, 1989). Crises may
lead to change by exposing cleavages between groups that were previously only weakly
united on policies. The widening of these cleavage may then allow new coalitions, with
new interests, to form (Gourevitch, 1986). Crises may provide space for policy (or norm)
entrepreneurs to push for new political agendas that reflect the preferences or ideologies
of these newly defined coalitions (Chwieroth, 2010b; Culpepper, 2008). Shocks may push
employees from one sector of the economy to another, which may lead them to form
political alliances with new groups and favor policies that they may have previously
opposed. Although this movement across industries is more of akin to a Heckscher-Ohlin
model, the logic of this chapter is not solely based o a Ricardo-Viner model.
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Crises may also change domestic institutions (Culpepper, 2008). Institutional change
may result in dramatic policy shifts because actors that benefit from new institutional
contexts become more likely to see favorable policies implemented (Lake, 2009). For
instance, Milner and Kubota (2005) argue that the move toward democratization in the
developing world increased the likelihood that policymakers would enact policies more
favorable to the workers that made up the majority of these societies. Less democratic
institutions, which were previously more common throughout the developing world, could
more easily ignore the demands of these non-elite actors (De Mesquita and Smith, 2005).
Therefore, crises may lead to policy change with institutional change as an intervening
variable.
These studies imply that absent any broad economic or institutional shocks, we should
expect to see relatively stable policies and policy preferences over time. Stable coalitions
should not push for change and policy entrepreneurs are unlikely to have a strong platform
from where they may push for ideational change. Yet change is often observed absent
any broad domestic economic or institutional shock. In 2016, for example, the generally
pro-free trade Republican Party in the United States nominated a candidate who strongly
opposed free trade agreements. Furthermore, a set of studies showed that after the 2008
financial crisis, coalitions and did not immediately shift (Kahler and Lake, 2013). The
so-called neoliberal agenda, which favors free capital mobility and deregulation, among
other policy prescriptions, remained largely intact following the crisis, even though the
financial crash may have been interpreted as a failure of the agenda’s policy prescriptions
(Stiglitz, 2016). Coalitions may have shifted as a result of the crisis with an eight year
time lag, but literature on how crises lead to change generally suggests change will occur
shortly after a crisis. Chwieroth (2010b) acknowledges this temporal process, but argues
that we should see experimentation with new policies and institutions quickly after a
crisis. Furthermore, as noted in the introduction, individual attitudes toward policies
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such as free trade may shift dramatically absent any shock. Taken together, it seems that
neither domestic economic nor institutional shocks appear to be necessary or sufficient
to shift lobbying capabilities and employment trends within a country.
4.3 International Origins of Power
Revenue and employees are key sources of political influence. The above literature
suggests that when revenues and employees flow from one segment of the economy to
another, we are more likely to observe policy change favorable to firms that gain revenue
and employees relative to others. But if shocks are neither necessary nor sufficient to shift
revenue and employees across an economy, what explains variation in political influence?
First, we must more clearly define the actors. Literature that analyzes actors’ prefer-
ences regarding foreign trade nearly always distinguishes between actors by who stands
to benefit from liberalization, on one hand, and those who may benefit from protection,
on the other. Although much of the literature focuses on either factors of production,
specific industries, or firms, all of this is in an attempt to unearth who stands to benefit
or lose from specific economic policies. Accordingly we may follow a conventional prac-
tice (Frieden, 1991, 2014) that divides actors between those with internationally-oriented
interests and those with domestically-oriented interests.2 The former are likely to seek
policies designed to boost exports while the latter may favor policies designed to protect
producers of goods and services to be sold in the domestic economy.
Elementary supply and demand analysis tells us that the price of a good or service
tends to rise with demand. In response to rising demand, firms generally increase out-
2Industrial-level analyses tends to define these competing interests as those in the tradable and those
in the non-tradable sector or between exporters and import-competing industries. However, firm-level
analyses have pointed out that several firms in the tradable sector do not export (Osgood et al., ming).
For analytical clarity, I define groups as those with internationally-oriented interests, or those that are
likely to export, and those with domestically-oriented interests, or those less likely to export.
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put. Assuming that labor and capital inputs are not perfect substitutes in the firm’s
production function, a higher price increases the value of the marginal product of labor,
which encourages the firm to hire more employees. Although intuition may suggest that
higher demand for a product may lead firms to substitute toward capital investments
and away from labor, as long as the relative prices of a firm’s inputs remain steady, firms
will generally increase their employment of labor and their other inputs by more or less
equal proportions as they seek to boost output.3 In other words, the level of demand
influences firms’ output levels, which then affects firms’ hiring decisions. Firms that ex-
perience growing demand for their goods or services are likely to increase both revenue
and employees, which, as argued above, are key sources of political influence.
Aggregate demand is generally defined in terms of gross domestic product (GDP).4
Assuming a firm produces normal goods – demand for the good increases with income – a
rise of GDP may be expected to increase demand for the firm’s goods or services as well.
But we may gain further insight into who gains a potential for influence by distinguishing
between domestic and foreign demand, as these may not fluctuate in unison.
An increase in GDP in major foreign markets may increase demand for a country’s
exports. As exporting firms increase output in response to higher demand, they are
likely to increase employment. This may then result in employees moving from non-
exporting firms to exporting firms. Furthermore, as firms increase output to meet higher
demand they will have more revenue that they can use to lobby policymakers. Therefore,
economic growth abroad may better position actors with internationally-oriented interests
to influence policy.
If domestically-oriented actors produce goods and services that do not compete with
imports, declining foreign GDP may lead demand at home for domestically-oriented
3This is known as the scale effect.
4Aggregate demand and GDP are the same if prices are fixed.
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goods to rise relative to demand for exports. A relative increase in domestic GDP may
also cause the real exchange rate to appreciate, which would further decrease demand for
a country’s exports. In this scenario, demand for goods and services sold in the domestic
market would rise relative to goods whose demand emanates from abroad. Here we
would expect revenues to rise for those with domestically-oriented interests relative to
those that benefit from exports. Because declining GDP abroad is likely to decrease
exports, export-intensive industries may decrease employment, leading employees to flow
from exporting industries to non-exporting industries. Thus declining GDP abroad may
lead actors with domestically-oriented preferences to gain sources of influence relative to
those with more internationally-oriented preferences.
Distinguishing between changes in GDP at home versus changes in GDP in a state’s
major export markets provides insights into whether domestically-oriented or internationally-
oriented actors are more likely to see demand for their goods and services rise. Rising
demand may result in increased revenues and the movement of employees across the
economy. If growth abroad increases the demand for a country’s exports, we would ex-
pect exporters to gain sources of influence relative to those that sell their products in the
domestic market.
This chapter argues that growth abroad leads to more revenue for exporters relative
to others in the domestic economy. With more revenue firms can seek to influence policy
through two channels: employment and lobbying. Formally, this process may be stated
in the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Economic growth abroad leads to increased revenue for exporters
relative to those in other industries
Admittedly, Hypothesis 1 is more akin to a premise than a hypothesis. But because
it is both testable and central to the following two hypotheses, I test it independently.
The remaining hypotheses are:
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Hypothesis 2: Increased revenue for exporters leads to more employment in export-
oriented industries relative to other industries
Hypothesis 3: Increased revenue for exporters leads to more lobbying by exporting
industries relative to other industries
4.4 Data and Evidence
I test Hypotheses 1 and 2 using data on 34 OECD countries over the time period 1980
to 2013. A full list of these countries is available in Appendix 1. Although not all of these
countries were members of the OECD over the whole time period, I include each of these
countries for each year in which data are available in this chapter’s analysis. Because of
limitations of lobbying data, I test Hypothesis 3 with an analysis of the United States.
4.4.1 Revenue
To capture revenue, I use exports as a percentage of GDP. Revenue is generally seen
as synonymous with sales; if exports rise as a percentage of GDP, revenue for exporters
must rise relative to others in the economy. I use both the absolute level of exports and
the percent change from the previous year. Data for this variable come from the World
Bank national accounts data.
Revenue, or exports, are hypothesized to co-vary with the rate of economic growth
in each country’s export markets. Rather than simply taking the average rate of growth
abroad, or change in global GDP, I operationalize the independent variable as the trade
weighted change in real GDP in each country’s export markets. This accounts for the
fact that growth in a main export market is likely to have more of a domestic impact
than growth in a more peripheral market. To measure economic growth, I use the percent
change in real GDP, provided by the World Bank. For the trade weighting measure, I
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use IMF direction of trade statistics. Although this study limits its analysis to OECD
countries, I use all possible export destinations for these countries wherever data are
available. Between 1980 and 2013 the minimum number of export destinations is 124
countries, while the maximum is 190 countries and the median number of export destina-
tions over the 34 year time period is 182 countries. In total there are 5,767 country-year
observations for export markets over the time period.
To calculate this variable, GDP Abroad for each year, I put the 34 OECD countries
of interest into rows and their export destinations into columns. I then put each of these
matrices together into a matrix, W, that is in the form of a block diagonal where each
block represents a year. I then row standardize W and matrix-multiply it by the vector
of the percent change in real GDP for each export country for each year.
This variable does not distinguish between countries that have signed preferential
trade agreements (PTAs) and those that do not. Although debate exists on whether
free trade agreements are endogenous to the amount of exports (Rose, 2004; Tomz et al.,
2007), the positive relationship between trade and PTAs is robust. By using total exports
between countries, PTAs are likely captured by this measure.
To test Hypothesis 1, I use standard macroeconomic control variables that may also
affect exporters’ relative revenue. I include a variable for the change in domestic real
GDP, as this may affect economic growth abroad and exports as a percentage of GDP.
I include a variable for logged GDP per capita to control for variation in the behavior
between richer and poorer countries. I also control for inflation.
Finally, to control for political parties favoring different industries, I include a variable
for the partisan orientation of the executive. Where dummy variables are included for
Right Exec., Center Exec, and Undefined Exec. Left executives thus serve as the baseline
group. I also include a dummy variable indicating whether a country has proportional
representation, denoted below as Prop. Rep. Data for these variables come from the
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World Bank political institutions database (Beck et al., 2001).
To control for unit and year specific heterogeneity I use OLS with country specific
fixed effects. Fixed effects control for various unobserved factors. For example, interest
group bargaining is shaped by corporatism in European countries (Lijphart, 1999). The
inclusion of fixed effects will control for these broad institutional factors, provided they
were invariant over the time period of this chapter’s analysis. I also include, but do not
present the results for, a cubic polynomial to control for broad time trends. To test the
first hypothesis, I estimate the following equation:
Exportsi,t = β1W ×GDP Foreigni,t +
n∑
k=1
γkXk,i,t + αi + εi,t (4.1)
Where the dependent variable is exports, I take the natural log because the variable
is heavily skewed to the right. β1 estimates the effect of the trade weighted change in
GDP abroad, where W is a row-standardized matrix that captures the amount of exports
from state i to state j and GDP Foreigni,t captures change in GDP abroad. X is a vector
of control variables, with k indexing the n control variables. αi captures the country
specific fixed effects and ηi captures the year specific fixed effects. I also estimate a
separate model where the logged percent change in exports is used as the dependent
variable rather than the logged level of exports as a percentage of GDP.
Reverse causality does not present itself as an obvious problem for identification. It is
unlikely that increases in an industry’s exports also causes GDP abroad to rise – imports
tend count against a country’s total GDP, so an increase in exports could only serve to
worsen a country’s trade partners’ GDP. Table 4.1 presents the results.
Table 4.1 supports Hypothesis 1. The rate of GDP growth abroad is positive and
statistically significant across all models, holding other variables constant. Model one
shows that a one percent increase in the trade weighted GDP abroad is associated with
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Table 4.1: Exports as a Function of Growth Abroad
Dependent variable:
Exports (log) Change Exports (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP Abroad 0.019∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
GDP Per Capita (Log) −0.141∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.054) (0.053)
Inflation 0.0004 0.0005 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Center Exec. 0.004 0.017
(0.032) (0.032)
Right Exec. −0.008 −0.007
(0.022) (0.022)
Undefined Exec. 0.014 0.024
(0.067) (0.071)
Eurozone −0.002 −0.006
(0.043) (0.043)
PR −0.169∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.034)
Observations 1,045 992 900 1,015 965 876
R2 0.561 0.558 0.568 0.581 0.584 0.580
Adjusted R2 0.540 0.536 0.541 0.559 0.560 0.551
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
110
The International Foundations of Interest Group Influence Chapter 4
a 1.9 percentage point increase in exports as a percentage of GDP.
This is a substantively strong relationship. Over the time duration of the sample,
exports made up about ten percent of the United States’ GDP. According to the model,
a one percentage point increase in growth abroad would boost US exports to 11.3 percent
of GDP. Because the US economy is so large, at $16.77 trillion in 2013, an increase of
1.9 percent is substantial – an increase of about $318.6 billion.
Including control variables leaves the results largely unchanged. The estimate remains
both statistically and substantively significant across the models. This provides strong
evidence that economic growth abroad increases the revenue of exporters relative to
others in the economy. However, this result tells us little about how exporters may turn
this revenue into political influence. The next two sections explore the effect revenue has
on employment and lobbying.
4.4.2 Employment
Hypothesis 2 states that an increase in revenue is associated with an increase in
employment in industries most likely to export. However, exports could potentially be
endogenous to employment decisions. For example, a policy could be passed that is favor-
able to exporters, which leads exporting firms to increase employment. Furthermore, this
chapter is interested in the effect of GDP growth abroad on employment decisions. Thus
we are interested in how the variation in exports explained by growth abroad predicts
employment rates in export industries. I use two stage least squares, using the rate of
GDP growth abroad to instrument for exports. As a robustness check, available in Sup-
plementary Appendix 1, I use the difference between foreign and domestic GDP growth
as a predictor of exports. These results are available in the supplementary appendix.
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Formally, I estimate the following system of equations:
Exportsi,t = β1W ×GDP Foreigni,t +
n∑
k=1
γkXk,i,t + αi + εi,t (4.2)
Employmenti,t = β1Exportsi,t +
n∑
k=1
γkXk,i,t + αi + εi,t (4.3)
Note that (2) is equivalent to (1), although I use different control variables because
likely confounding variables are different with employment and exports as the dependent
variable. As above, I take the natural log of Exports because the variable is heavily
skewed to the right. The dependent variable used to test Hypothesis 2 is employment in
exporting industries. Although firms may not directly mobilize their employees to vote
in their favor, much evidence abounds that employees care primarily about keeping their
jobs (Jensen et al., 2016). If firms are adding additional employees we may presume that
these employees will support policies that benefit the firm insofar as these policies allow
them to keep their jobs. I use sectoral data to infer which sectors are most likely to
export.
Evidence suggests that large firms, especially in manufacturing, are responsible for
most of the hiring and firing of workers (Davis et al., 1996). When times are good
for large firms they are able to add employees to their payrolls. But when the good
times stall they are quick to layoff employees. Although large firms may be responsible
for most hiring and firing decisions, we cannot assume that they have full control over
their employees’ preferences. Given the link between employment and the likelihood of
voting for an incumbent, however, large firms likely hold much indirect influence over
incumbents – firms can threaten to fire workers and move operations overseas regardless
of the state of the economy. Furthermore, as stated above, firms are likely to have
heterogeneous preferences toward international economic policy. Because not all large
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firms depend on exports, it is unlikely that large firms will always prefer policies favorable
to exporters. But all else equal, large firms will likely have more influence over policy
than smaller firms. And evidence suggests that large firms are typically the ones that
will export (Madeira, 2014). Following Osgood et al. (ming) I define export sectors as
manufacturing, mining, and agriculture.
These industries, especially manufacturing, have several characteristics that would
allow them to successfully pressure governments (Steinberg, 2015). In a study of exchange
rate policy, Steinberg (2015) argues the manufacturing sector is well situated to have
political influence. The sector is relatively concentrated to facilitate collective action
and in several countries, it controls a large proportion of economic resources, resulting
in a high employment rates. Thus, the manufacturing sector carries a large amount
of political influence (Steinberg, 2015). Other sectors, such as mining and agriculture,
also often consist of a small number of large firms, which facilitates collective action
(Olson, 1965). But because these industries may be more geographically diffused than
manufacturing they are unlikely to be driving the results.
I operationalize the concentration of employment in these industries in each country
as the change in total employment in these three industries as a proportion of total
employment in each country. These data come from the International Labor Organization
(ILO). More formally, I use the sum of employment in these three industries divided by the
sum of employment across every industry for which the ILO provides data. But, not all
firms, even in export-oriented industries export. Therefore, there may be growth in firms
in these industries that do not export and thus may not pressure governments to enact
export-friendly policies. However, as stated above most large firms in export-industries
export. These large firms are responsible for most hiring and firing in industries such as
manufacturing (Davis et al., 1996). Therefore, employment gains in an export-oriented
industry are likely to be driven by large firms, which are more likely to export.
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I use two versions of this employment concentration variable. The first is the raw
proportion of employees in exporting industries; the other is the annual percent change
of total employees in exporting industries. In the models where the dependent variable
is calculated as a percent change, the independent variable is also calculated as a percent
change.
The control variables in this model are slightly different than those used to test
Hypothesis 1. Unions largely affect the ability of firms to hire and fire workers. In
countries with high Union Density, employees may be less likely to move from an industry
performing relatively poorly to one performing comparatively well. Therefore, I include
a variable that captures the proportion of paid workers who are members of unions. Data
for this variable comes from the OECD.
I also control for domestic GDP Per Capita, as country size may influence both the
level of exports as a percentage of GDP and employment in export related industries.
Due to missing data, the variable for Proportional Representation is absorbed in the
country fixed effects.
Table 4.2 provides the results.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that an increase in exports will lead to a higher proportion
of employment in export industries – defined here as manufacturing, agriculture, and
mining. The models that just use a time trend and the key independent variable are not
significant in any of the models, although they are in the correct direction. However, the
models are correctly signed and statistically significant after including various controls.
Model 6 in Table 4.2 shows that a one percent increase in exports is associated with a
.0003 increase in the proportion of those employed in an export industry.5 This effect does
not seem particularly large, although the estimated effect is larger when using growth
5The result is nearly identical when not using the change in domestic real GDP in the first stage
regression.
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Table 4.2: Employment as a Function of Revenue, 2SLS
Dependent variable:
Prop. Employed Prop. Employed
(Proportion) (Pct. Change of Proportion)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Exports (IV) 0.035∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.035) (0.029)
Pct. Change Exports (IV) 0.027∗ 0.027∗∗ −0.029 0.083∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.013) (0.024) (0.029)
GDP Per Capita (Log) −0.022∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007)
Inflation 0.0004 0.001 0.0003 0.0003 −0.0003 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Imports (Log) −0.078∗∗ −0.047 0.027 −0.053∗
(0.036) (0.029) (0.021) (0.029)
Union Density 0.001∗ 0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Center Exec. −0.0002 −0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
Right Exec. −0.004∗∗ −0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Undefined Exec. 0.0001 0.005
(0.008) (0.007)
Observations 322 322 322 308 296 296 294 283
R2 0.847 0.848 0.790 0.829 0.847 0.847 0.843 0.825
Adjusted R2 0.763 0.761 0.707 0.730 0.756 0.753 0.746 0.717
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
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abroad to instrument for exports while remaining statistically significant. However, the
effect may reflect a substantial movement of workers to export-oriented industries.
From World Bank estimates, in 2013 about 17.26 million people were employed in
Spain.6 The results in Model 6 suggest that a one percent increase in growth abroad
would be associated with a move of more than 51 thousand people to export-oriented
industries. Although the estimate of 0.003 seems small, the large numbers involved
suggest small changes in the proportion of workers in an export-oriented industry would
have substantively large results.
Other control variables do not have an clearly stronger effect on the proportion of
employment in export-oriented industries. The level of GDP per capita has a slightly
smaller effect than exports on employment in export industries. An increase in inflation
is also negatively associated with employment in exporting sectors. This relationship
makes sense, given that higher prices without an offsetting exchange rate adjustment
will likely reduce exports and revenue to hire employees.
The results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide strong evidence that growth abroad is
associated with more revenue and employment in export industries. But do exporters
also use this extra revenue to directly influence policy through lobbying?
4.4.3 Lobbying: The Case of US Exporters
Laws in the United States require lobbyists to register and report the amount of
money they spend on lobbying efforts.The Center for Responsive Politics tracks several
domains of where money is donated, including the amount of money various interest
groups spend in a given year. We can look at specific sectors and observe how much
money they spent in each year on various lobbying efforts. Data are generally available
6The World Bank estimates that 23,419,920 people were in Spain’s labor force. The unemployment
rate was 26.3 percent. The total number of employed individuals is then 23,419,920×(1-.263).
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annually from 1998 to 2016. To my knowledge, there is no comparable data set in other
OECD countries, making cross national comparisons difficult.
The industries are defined slightly different than the ILO’s definition, used above. I
define export industries from this data as follows: miscellaneous manufacturing, chemical
manufacturing, lodging/tourism, steel production, textiles, oil and gas, miscellaneous en-
ergy, mining, and fisheries and wildlife. These categories are consistent with the definition
used above, which is common in the literature Osgood et al. (ming).
Although these data are at the industry level – and not all actors in the industry
export – the data show which companies make the largest donations. In 2015, General
Electric was the biggest donor in the category of miscellaneous manufacturing. GE
donated donated $20,880,000 while the industry total in 2015 was $105,904,266 – or
nearly 20 percent of the industry total where 294 clients gave donations. As stated
above, new trade theory predicts that large firms are most likely to export. These large
industries, in an export-intensive industry also dominate lobbying. Therefore, within
industry-level data it is reasonable to infer that the firms within these industries that are
driving the amount of lobbying also export.
To test Hypothesis 3, I estimate the following equation:
Lobbyingt = α + β1Exportst +
n∑
k=1
γkXk,t + εt (4.4)
Although a two stage least squares approach would be desirable to test Hypothesis
3 – as it was to test Hypothesis 2 – GDP growth abroad is not a strong predictor of
exports in the United States.7 Therefore, two stage least squares would suffer from the
weak instrument problem.
The dependent variable, lobbying, is calculated by taking the total donations of these
7Although Table 4.1 shows that it is, on average, a strong predictor.
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export-intensive industries and dividing this value sum by the total amount of donations
for each year over the time period. I divide by the total amount of donations because the
secular trend toward more lobbying over time – especially after the Citizens United deci-
sion – would make the donations from the export-intensive industries increase regardless.
The key explanatory variable is Exports as a proportion of GDP. Because this variable
only comes from the United States, it is not heavily skewed and thus I do not take the
natural log. I include other control variables that may also predict both exports and the
amount of lobbying donations from export-sectors.
As Imports increase import-competing sectors or firms that use imports as inputs
may increase their lobbying efforts, thus pressuring exporters to further increase political
donations.
Partisanship, or Republican Exec., may affect both lobbying and exports as one party
may be more likely to pass policies favorable to the export sector and thus gain more
donations from those in the sector.
Economic growth may also affect lobbying decisions as well as the total number of
exports. Therefore, I include a variable, Change Real GDP, to capture annual economic
fluctuations, which may affect both exports and lobbying.
Finally, the money supply is a key factor that shapes the exchange rate, which may
also affect exports, and therefore, lobbying by exporters.8 Therefore, I include a variable
for M2 to capture shifts in the money supply and inflation to capture shifts in price
levels. Table 4.3 presents the results.
The models throughout Table 4.3 consistently show that exports are positively related
to lobbying by the export sector. The first model shows that a one percentage point
increase in exports as a percentage of GDP is associated with a .006 increase in the
8Although the US Federal Reserve is nominally independent, exporters may lobby for policies designed
to offset Fed policies that may damper exports.
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Table 4.3: Lobbying as a Function of Revenue
Dependent variable:
Lobbying by Export Industries
(Proportion of Total Lobbying)
(15) (16) (17) (18)
Exports 0.006∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Imports −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗ −0.005∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Republican Exec. −0.003 −0.002 −0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Inflation −0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
M2 −0.0003
(0.0005)
Change Real GDP −0.002∗∗
(0.001)
Constant 0.046∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 18 18 16 16
R2 0.586 0.844 0.854 0.913
Adjusted R2 0.560 0.811 0.801 0.855
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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proportion of lobbying by exporters. Given the large amount of money donated, this is
substantively significant. The average annual amount of donations over the time period
is about $2.58 billion, meaning a one percentage point increase in exports as a percentage
of GDP is associated with $15.48 million more donated.
Given the small number of observations, these results should be taken cautiously.
Nonetheless, for such a small sample the model fits the data very well, as the adjusted
r-squared ranges from 0.586 to 0.9. This strong model fit and relationship between
exports and lobbying by export industries, suggests that the industries defined above as
export-intensive do indeed lobby for policies favorable to exporters.
To highlight the strong relationship between exports and lobbying of exporters Figure
4.1 shows the annual proportion of donations by exporter-intensive industries from 1998
to 2015 with a 95 percent confidence interval and the line of best fit from the first model
in Table 4.3 with each year denoted on the plot.
Figure 4.1 shows the strong relationship between exports and lobbying by export-
intensive industries. Aside from the small sample size, the results do not account for the
potential of reverse causality – increased lobbying may well increase exports. But this
relationship is to be expected; lobbyists are unlikely to push for policies that do them no
benefit. More revenue gained from exports is likely channeled into lobbying efforts in an
effort to further increase export revenue.
Taken together, these empirical results strongly suggest that growth abroad increases
revenue for firms in export-intensive industries. These firms are then able to increase
employment, thereby creating voters that are more likely to support policies that are
favorable to trade. Revenue increases are also associated with an increase in lobbying,
which is likely an effort by exporters to gain more favorable policies.
This chapter has not independently tested the proposition that employees tend to mo-
bilize on their employers’ behalf. This is largely because a litany of studies, highlighted in
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Figure 4.1: Lobbying Donations by Exporters as Proportion of Total Donations, 1998 –
2015
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the literature review, already shows this is the case (Hertel-Fernandez, ming; Jensen et al.,
2016; Margalit, 2011; Schlozman et al., 2012). For instance, in a representative survey of
monetary policy preferences, Bearce and Tuxhorn (ming) find that individuals who are
employed in firms that conduct much oversees business transactions opposed monetary
policies that may reduce their firms’ competitiveness. Presumably, if these respondents
moved to a firm that conducted most of its business domestically, the respondents would
have different monetary policy preferences. Much economic voting literature shows that
individuals who lose their job are less likely to vote for the incumbent; those that remain
employed are likely to support the incumbent (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Bartels, 2014;
Jensen et al., 2016). Thus employees’ economic policy preferences are intimately tied to
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their firms’ material interests.
Evidence suggests that, at least in this dimension, employees are likely to mobilize
and vote with these preferences in mind. Given the plethora of studies showing that
employees tend to have preferences in line with their employers, and that additional
evidence on this subject would likely require an individual chapter, it is beyond the
scope of this study to provide additional analysis on this relationship.
4.5 Conclusion
Although interest group preferences have long been studied in international political
economy scholarship, few studies have directly analyzed the conditions under which these
preferences are more or less likely to be turned into policy.9 This is not only true for
IPE scholarship, but also true across political science and public policy research (Du¨r
and De Bie`vre, 2007). This lack of attention is due, in no small part, to the difficulty
of operationalizing terms such as power and influence. Although power is inherently
difficult to measure, actors’ preferences are meaningless if these actors lack the ability
to turn their preferences into policy. Thus more attention must be paid to the power of
domestic interest groups. This chapter begins to explore what factors shape domestic
actors’ ability to influence policy. By analyzing how international factors play a key role
in shaping interest groups potential influence, this study also gives international elements
a more central role in its analysis. Studies of international economic policy, especially
those analyzing preferences, often ignore international factors and generally focus on
domestic-level features (Oatley, 2011).
This chapter provides evidence that international factors, namely the performance
of a state’s trade markets, shape the ability of interest groups to influence policy. The
9This is not necessarily the case in analyses at the international level, where scholars have analyzed
state power and influence in much greater detail. See (Andrews, 2006; Cohen, 2015).
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empirical results show that economic growth in a state’s export markets is associated
with more revenue for exporters. This revenue boost is then associated with increased
employment in export-intensive industries. Because employees are a source of political
power, more employment likely helps firms gain favorable policies. The analysis of the
United States also shows that increased revenues are associated with increased lobbying.
Here, evidence suggests firms use revenues to directly seek to influence policymakers.
Therefore, economic growth abroad provides internationally-oriented interest groups with
a greater capability to influence policy through more employees and more lobbying.
This chapter further extends our understanding of how crises lead to change. The
results suggest that growth abroad may tilt the balance of power in favor of those with
internationally-oriented interests. Increased revenue and employment relative to those
with domestically-oriented interests are likely to result in policies more favorable to ex-
porters. It is unsurprising that if the domestic economy went into a deep recession we
would observe exporters gain political influence. But if the domestic economy and foreign
economies all went into recession, we may not see relative revenues shift nor may we ob-
serve employment shift from one segment of the economy to another. Here it is less likely
that crises would lead to change. Finally, change may result absent any large shock – or
a crisis. This is perhaps because influence generally shifts incrementally. Strong growth
abroad may marginally increase exporters’ revenue and employment profiles, thus result-
ing in change. This deeper analysis of international factors deepens our understanding
of how policy change occurs.
This chapter also has important political implications. Politicians across the OECD
are pushing against further integration into the global economy. With much of the
developed world facing anemic economic growth, this chapter’s analysis suggests that
interest groups that favor more integration are losing resources to push for their interests.
Under these conditions we would expect interests that favor a more closed economic
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system to be gaining political influence vis-a-vis those that favor a more open system.
With an avowed protectionist elected as US president and Britain voting to exit the
European Union we are clearly seeing a decline in political influence of internationally-
oriented interests. This chapter offers deeper insight into these contemporary political
battles as well as prospects for the future shape of the global economic system.
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4.6 First Stage of 2SLS
Table 4.2 uses two stage least squares, using GDP growth abroad and change in
domestic real GDP to instrument for exports. The first stage results are in Table 4.4.
Note that two dependent variables are measured in Table 4.2, the independent variables
in the first four models are the same as those in the second four models. Therefore, only
four first stage models are necessary. Furthermore, note that this table is nearly identical
to Table 4.1, the only different is the use of Union Density as a control variable.
Table 4.4: First Stage Regression
Dependent variable:
Exports Exports
Percent of GDP Percent Change
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
GDP Abroad 0.019∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.0002 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP Per Capita (Log) −0.141∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.030∗ −0.022 −0.147∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.038∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016) (0.017)
Inflation 0.0004∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Imports (Log) 0.696∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030)
Union Density −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Center Exec. −0.025∗ −0.008
(0.015) (0.015)
Right Exec. −0.015∗∗ −0.018∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Undefined Exec. −0.0001 −0.011
(0.018) (0.018)
Observations 1,045 992 982 891 1,015 965 955 869
R2 0.561 0.558 0.760 0.772 0.581 0.584 0.767 0.781
Adjusted R2 0.540 0.536 0.729 0.734 0.559 0.560 0.734 0.742
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.7 Robustness Check
In the first stage regression used to test Hypothesis 2, I hold constant domestic real
GDP. But exports may be affected more by the rate of economic growth abroad relative
to the rate of growth in the domestic economy rather than simply by the rate of growth
abroad. As a robustness check, I reestimate the the models in Table 4.2 with a new
instrumental variable, which is calculated by taking the difference between the trade
weighted rate of economic growth abroad and the rate of domestic economic growth.
The main results are unchanged.
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Table 4.5: Employment as a Function of Revenue, Robustness Check
Dependent variable:
Prop. Employed Prop. Employed
(Raw Proportion) (Pct. Change)
(27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34)
Exports (IV) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 1.581∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.021) (0.258) (0.490) (0.019) (0.024) (0.128) (0.172)
GDP Per Capita (Log) −0.018∗∗ −0.082 −0.060 −0.015∗ −0.057 −0.046
(0.009) (0.064) (0.113) (0.009) (0.035) (0.043)
Imports (Log) −0.521∗∗ −0.926∗ −0.279∗∗ −0.348∗
(0.264) (0.498) (0.136) (0.183)
Inflation 0.006∗∗ 0.007 0.0004 0.0001
(0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002)
M2 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Union Density 0.011∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.005) (0.002)
Center Exec. 0.053 0.008
(0.049) (0.020)
Right Exec. −0.048∗ −0.015
(0.025) (0.009)
Undefined Exec. −0.154∗∗ −0.043∗
(0.068) (0.022)
Observations 322 322 259 246 296 296 240 228
R2 0.812 0.806 0.200 0.076 0.802 0.793 0.447 0.332
Adjusted R2 0.734 0.726 0.174 0.064 0.718 0.708 0.384 0.278
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
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Conclusion
By placing international factors at the center of its analysis, this dissertation has sought
to provide a deeper understanding of the domestic politics of fiscal policy. Chapter two
argues that policymakers may consider how taxing and spending policies abroad may
affect demand for goods and services at home. This may then lead to an equilibrium
where states respond to economic recessions and recoveries with a smaller stimulus that
may be required to bring an economy to a sustained recovery.
An analysis of the international effects of fiscal policy also provides insights to how
policymakers may use fiscal policy to boost their reelection prospects. Chapter three
provides evidence that when a state’s export markets are performing well relative to the
domestic economy, incumbents tend to enact more contractionary policies. The empirical
analysis and case study provides evidence that incumbents may gain electorally from
contractionary policies conditional on weak relative economic performance. This finding
runs contrary to claims that fiscal policy does little to influence the outcomes of elections
(Alesina et al., 1997; Arias and Stasavage, 2016).
Finally, Chapter four provides evidence that the state of a country’s main export
markets can affect the ability of pressure groups to influence policy. These shifts in
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interest group influence over policy may be largely exogenous to domestic politics, which
suggests that the sources of interest group influence are affected partially by factors that
domestic policymakers have little ability to control.
Although chapter four does not directly analyze how interest groups influence fis-
cal policy, it is likely that internationally and domestically-oriented interest groups have
divergent preferences toward fiscal policy (Frieden, 1991, 2014). For example, chapter
three points out that a contractionary fiscal policy generally makes exports more compet-
itive. Similarly, Chapter four shows that when a state’s export markets are performing
well, those with internationally-oriented preferences are likely to gain influence policy
outputs. Therefore, when a state’s export markets are performing well we would expect
more contractionary policies through both the electoral incentives of policymakers as well
as through interest group lobbying. Taken together, the findings in chapter four serve to
reinforce those in chapter three.
One shortcoming of this project is that the data used to measure fiscal policy is at
a high level of aggregation. But fiscal policy includes several dimensions. Expenditures,
for instance, may range from infrastructure investment, expenditures for education and
health care, and military spending, among others. These various dimensions likely have
differing electoral consequences. Investments in human capital, for example, may not
directly affect the economy in the short-term, where as tax cuts or increased infrastructure
investment may have a more short-term effect on the economy. Future research should
analyze these various dimensions of fiscal policy.
As this dissertation is being completed in December 2016, policymakers have been
pushing for less integration with the global economy. Donald Trump’s election in the
United States and the vote in Britain to exit the European Union are emblematic of
the push against global integration. Since the 2008 financial crisis the developed world
has experienced meager economic growth. This dissertation suggests that these events
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are related. As chapter four argues, weak growth abroad is likely to increase the policy
influence of interest groups that would push against deeper integration into the global
economy.
Much of this weak economic growth is likely the product of a premature austerity
policies throughout the developed world before a robust recovery took place (Blyth,
2013). Chapter two shows that incentives stemming from economic integration may
have led states to prematurely engage in contractionary policies, thus prolonging the
weak recovery. Therefore, incentives that led states to prematurely engage in fiscal
consolidation may have increased the likelihood that interests that favored less integration
with the global economy would become more politically empowered.
As alluded to in Chapter 2, the weak response to the 2008 financial crisis is similar to
a problem of public goods. If policymakers could have credibly committed to maintaining
expansionary fiscal policies, a robust economic recovery may have been more likely to
follow. This may have provided those with more internationally-oriented preferences a
greater ability to influence policy. But it seems as though the reverse occurred.
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